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Home ownership represents an important social and economic cornerstone of Australian 
society. In addition to providing security of tenure, ownership has represented an important 
savings vehicle by which Australians can accumulate wealth over the life-cycle. While 
aggregate home ownership rates have remained relatively stable over recent decades, this has 
masked the increasing challenge that some groups have experienced attaining this form of 
tenure. For example, there is evidence of later transition into home ownership and a lower 
likelihood of home ownership among middle-upper-income Australians aged 25–44 years. 
Other groups, such as low-income households, have also experienced declines in home 
ownership rates. 
The reasons for these developments are varied and reflect social and demographic changes 
that have tended to delay or curtail the attainment of ownership. In some cases, such as later 
partnering, this will tend to reduce home ownership rates in early parts of the life-cycle. There 
is also evidence, especially recently, that economic developments have impacted entry into 
home ownership. Rapid increases in the price of housing have been accompanied by historic 
low levels of first-time home buyers. Such developments have occurred against a backdrop of 
relatively low interest rates and a downturn in the economy following the GFC that was 
moderate compared to other countries. One pattern that has attracted increasing attention is 
the role of parental transfers in facilitating entry into the housing market. The evidence around 
the nature and magnitude of such transfers is, however, limited and the analysis in this report 
seeks to present evidence on this phenomena. In particular, the analysis will consider bequests 
and inter vivos transfers from parents to their children. In examining these intergenerational 
transfers, three specific questions are addressed: 
 What is the nature of inter vivos transfers from older Australians to their children and what 
role do they play in facilitating sustainable housing outcomes? 
 What is the magnitude and nature of bequests and what role do they play in facilitating 
entry into the housing market? 
 What are the implications of intergenerational transfers for inequality and what are the likely 
consequences over time? 
The analytical approach in this report is economic in nature. That is, the analysis focuses on 
how the economic decisions and outcomes of individuals and households are affected by 
intergenerational transfers. The model of behaviour that motivates the analysis is one in which 
economic agents make utility maximising subject to the constraints they face. An 
intergenerational transfer can be characterised as relaxing the constraints faced by the 
recipients and in doing so present new opportunities for increased consumption, especially 
housing-related expenditures. Intergenerational transfers are also likely to have important 
implications for the distribution of wealth and the effect of this is considered in the empirical 
analysis. 
Existing literature on intergenerational transfers highlights the magnitude of such transfers 
across countries. Moreover, there is evidence, at least in an international context, that 
intergenerational transfers are used to facilitate and assist with entry into the housing market. 
The empirical evidence suggests that such transfers allow for entry into the housing market 
earlier than would be possible in the absence of the transfer, and relaxes the deposit or down 
payment constraint for first-time home buyers. Further, there is some evidence that 
intergenerational transfers tend to be inequality reducing reflecting the pattern whereby in a 
proportional sense, relatively wealthy recipients tend to receive less than their poorer 
counterparts. In Australia the evidence around the nature, extent and implications of 




The first empirical analysis uses a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology to identify 
the relationship between tenure outcomes in wave 10 of HILDA and the receipt of 
intergenerational transfers in the preceding nine waves of HILDA. The PSM methodology 
allows us to estimate the impact of a ‘treatment’, such as the receipt of a parental transfer or a 
bequest, on one group by comparing their outcomes to a control group comprising of persons 
who have never received a bequest, but who share a similar set of characteristics with the 
treatment sample. 
Its statistical appeal lies in its ability to identify a suitable control group in cases where a 
treatment is not randomly assigned. Bequests and parental transfers are non-randomly 
distributed across the population because there are personal characteristics that result in some 
individuals being more likely to receive these intergenerational transfers. For instance, it is 
conceivable that a person with a large number of siblings will have lower chances of receiving 
a parental gift or bequest as compared to a person who is an only child because their parents 
are less able to assist when there is a large number of children in a household. In this case, 
simply incorporating an indicator for receiving a transfer in a model of tenure outcome will 
produce biased estimates, as it will also capture the financial resourcefulness of one-child 
families and other unobservable factors that are correlated with receiving a bequest. The PSM 
methodology overcomes the challenge of non-random treatment by identifying a set of control 
observations that look similar to those which are treated, but which do not actually receive a 
treatment. The approach is termed ‘quasi-experimental’ as it provides a way of mimicking a 
randomised control trial where selection into a treatment is randomly assigned between control 
and treatment groups. 
The first step in the analysis involves identifying appropriate treatment and control groups. 
Analysis of the impact of bequests on the ‘treated group’ suggests that such transfers can have 
a marked impact on the likelihood of being observed in home ownership. The analysis 
indicates that receipt of a bequest increases home ownership rates among beneficiaries by 
between 4 and 8 percentage points. This impact is the effect of treatment (the receipt of a 
bequest) on the treated. Outright ownership is estimated to increase to be around 10 
percentage points higher among bequest recipients compared to non-recipients among 
individuals aged 25–65 years of age. Though parental transfers or gifts tend to be smaller than 
bequests, large impacts of parental transfers on ownership rates are also identified. Such an 
outcome likely reflects the timing and purpose associated with inter vivos transfers. 
The analysis of first home ownership uses a duration or hazard rate approach. The analysis 
identifies a positive relationship between the receipt of intergenerational transfers and the 
hazard or conditional transition into home ownership tenure for the first time. In particular, for 
the sample of individuals the hazard or probability of transition into first home ownership is 
effectively doubled in the period in which a bequest is received. As a point of comparison, 
marriage more than triples the conditional probability of transitioning into first-time home 
ownership. For couples, it is the receipt of a bequest in the previous period that is positively 
associated with the transition into home ownership. In the case of parental transfers or gifts, 
large (>$5000) inter vivos transfers are positively associated with transition into home 
ownership. The lack of a significant effect for inter vivos transfers in general most likely reflects 
the large number of small non-housing related transfers of this nature reported. Regression 
analysis also indicates that recipients of transfers (bequests and inter vivos) purchase a higher 
priced house compared to first-time home buyers who do not receive a transfer of this nature. 
This suggests that intergenerational transfers impact on first home ownership on two 
dimensions: increasing the likelihood that the recipients transition into ownership and 
increasing the value of the housing purchased. 
The final empirical analysis examines how intergenerational transfers impact on the distribution 
of wealth. The level of wealth holdings for any given household are likely to depend on a range 
of factors such as age, human capital, tenure status and transfers received. The focus in this 
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report is the role of transfers on the distribution of wealth and the methodological approach 
compares the actual distribution of wealth that is observed with the distribution of wealth that 
transfers in the form of bequests and inter vivos gifts not occurred. That is, a counterfactual or 
hypothetical wealth distribution is constructed on the basis of what would have happened if no 
inter vivos transfer or bequests had been received. Importantly, the methodological approach 
allows for other determinants of wealth, such as age, education and housing tenure to be 
controlled for when the counterfactual wealth distributions are calculated. 
A key advantage of the methodological approach is that the actual and counterfactual wealth 
distributions can be presented graphically. This is done using a series of density functions 
which indicate the likelihood or probability that households have a given level of wealth. The 
results point to two main findings. First, it is clear that renters are less likely to receive transfers 
compared to those in home ownership. Moreover, the transfers that did occur over the period 
2001–10 tended to increase overall inequality. While the analysis is largely descriptive in 
nature, it does flag the potential for wealth to become increasingly concentrated over time and 
the important role that housing and housing tenure may play in such an outcome. 
The findings in this report are important for the development of policies around tax and transfer 
polices in general, along with policies specifically targeted to encouraging home ownership. If 
the aim is to facilitate home ownership, the findings highlight the need to consider how policies 
may be more targeted especially to those groups who may not benefit from intergenerational 
transfers. More generally, the findings provide an opportunity to initiate a discussion around 
how the large wealth holdings held by older generations that benefitted from increasing house 
prices can be ‘unlocked’ so as to directly benefit younger generations, as well as relieving 




1.1 Motivation and aims of the project 
Home ownership represents an important part of the social and economic fabric in Australia. In 
addition to the security of tenure that ownership brings, it has important economic and welfare 
implications given the role that housing has traditionally placed in the accumulation of wealth 
over the life-cycle. The period since the Second World War has been characterised by 
increasing home ownership rates that plateaued at a relatively high rate compared to other 
countries. For many Australians, housing careers consisted of a period of co-residence with 
parents followed by a spell in rental tenure, prior to establishing oneself as an owner in the 
housing market. Over the life-cycle, there was a general expectation that households would 
‘trade-up’ the property ladder and achieve higher levels of housing consumption. 
Over the past few decades, a variety of social and economic developments have impacted on 
this ‘traditional’ housing career. Younger Australians, for example, are attaining higher levels of 
education before entering the workforce. While such a pattern will tend to delay entry into the 
home ownership market, other developments have led to the interruption of housing careers. In 
particular, a higher rate of relationship breakdown relative to the immediate post-war period 
has meant that in many cases housing careers are interrupted midway through the life-cycle. 
Economic developments have also been important. In Australia, the period since the mid-
1980s has been characterised by cycles featuring steep increases in house prices that then 
plateau at successively higher real levels. The recent increase in housing prices in Sydney and 
Melbourne in particular have focused attention on the affordability of housing for younger 
Australians and its impact on home ownership rates. While the home ownership rate among all 
individuals increased slightly between 1996 and 2006, this masks some significant changes for 
particular groups. For example, there is evidence of delayed entry into home ownership and a 
lower likelihood of home ownership among middle-upper-income young Australians between 
25–44 years old and those who are between 45–64 years old and on low-incomes (Yates & 
Bradbury 2010). Offsetting this, single adults have experienced increases in home ownership 
(Flood & Baker 2010). 
It is the case that there remains some debate about the exact cause of the rapid increase in 
housing prices in markets such as Sydney and Melbourne. Senior policy-makers including the 
Reserve Bank of Australia and Treasury have expressed some concern that the increase in 
prices has a speculative aspect driven by investors, rather than being driven by market 
fundamentals (Reserve Bank of Australia 2014; Janda & Clarke 2015). There is agreement, 
however, that the recent increase in prices has occurred at the same time as the proportion of 
first home buyers in the market has shrunk to historic lows. 
The apparent decline in entry into home ownership has a number of important economic 
implications. If younger Australians were to be excluded from the housing market, there could 
be important consequences for the accumulation of wealth and, in turn, this could impact on 
the sustainability of tax and transfer programs (Yates & Bradbury 2010). More generally, 
inequalities in the generation and distribution of wealth may arise if some groups are 
systemically excluded from housing markets. In this context, some concern has been 
expressed that members of the ‘Baby Boomers’ generation are using accumulated wealth to 
enhance their own holdings of property and, in doing so, making it more difficult for younger 
cohorts to move into home ownership (Willetts 2010). In this context, there is a realisation that 
more recent cohorts of Australians are unlikely to have the same experience of earlier 
generations which attained high rates of home ownership and then benefitted from the 
increased wealth that arose from rising property prices. 
One development that has gained increasing attention in light of the decline in the proportion of 
first home buyers is the potential for parental transfers to mitigate the effect of higher housing 
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prices. Parental or intergenerational assistance may take a number of forms including direct 
transfers or acting as guarantor for loans taken out by children. While there is some evidence 
that parental transfers have become more important vehicles by which younger cohorts can 
enter into home ownership, the evidence remains largely anecdotal (Anonymous 2014; Drury 
2014; Yeates 2015). 
If intergenerational transfers are important for housing careers, this has important implications 
on a number of economic, social and policy dimensions. First, intergenerational transfers may 
be confined to households that are relatively wealthy. Transfers will then have the potential to 
exacerbate existing inequalities over time. It may be the case, for example, that only younger 
cohorts in wealthy households receive transfers. These recipients will then have the 
opportunity to enter home ownership earlier in their housing careers, and are thereby able to 
accumulate more wealth (through a tax advantaged asset) than younger cohorts in less 
wealthy households that are unable to make transfers. 
In addition, intergenerational transfers have important implications for the design of tax and 
transfer policies. A well-defined tax system generally attempts to achieve vertical equity, a goal 
that is achieved when those who have a higher capacity to pay contribute more in the form of 
higher taxes. If intergenerational transfers are an important means to accumulate wealth, their 
tax treatment becomes an important question. Similarly, understanding how parental transfers 
substitute for or complement existing public transfers is important for designing effective 
policies. It may be the case that in the absence of demand-side subsidies such as the First 
Home owners Grants Scheme (FHOG), parents provide transfers to their offspring. 
Alternatively, an increase in such transfers might ‘crowd-out’ familial transfers so the net effect 
of such transfers is substantially mitigated. If transfers only occur in relatively affluent 
households, policy instruments that are targeted or means-tested might be more effective. In 
short, understanding the nature of transfers from parents to their children is likely to be an 
important consideration in designing effective policies. 
The aim of this project is to improve our understanding of the nature of intergenerational 
transfers in Australia and their implications for housing outcomes, and related economic 
behaviours and outcomes. At present, there is little evidence available about the frequency and 
size of intergenerational transfers or their impact, especially in the context of housing careers. 
To the extent that there is empirical evidence, it is largely anecdotal, somewhat dated and 
relies on data that arguably cannot be generalised to the Australian population. In analysing 
the nature, extent and implications of intergenerational transfers, this project begins to fill an 
important knowledge gap and thereby provide an evidence base on which policy can be 
developed. 
1.2 Research questions 
The research has two aims. First, to provide evidence on how housing careers and related 
economic outcomes are impacted by intergenerational transfers and the distributional 
consequences of those transfers over time. In undertaking this analysis, the research will feed 
directly into a range of policy issues around tax and transfer programs, as well as economic 
policies to ensure sustained economic growth. Second, the analysis will inform policies 
designed to ensure the sustainability of housing outcomes over the life-cycle as individuals 
seek to enter home ownership for the first time or respond to other life-events that impact on 
tenure status. 
The specific research questions to be addressed are: 
1. What is the magnitude and nature of bequests and what role do they play in facilitating 
home ownership, changes in housing consumption or assisting home buying households 
into outright home ownership? 
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2. What is the nature of inter vivos transfers from older Australians to their children and what 
role do they play in facilitating sustainable housing outcomes? 
3. What are the implications of intergenerational transfers for inequality and what are the likely 
consequences over time? 
The research questions are addressed via three related but nonetheless distinct pieces of 
quantitative analysis. In each case the analysis is undertaken using the Household, Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) dataset produced by the Melbourne Institute of 
Applied Economic Research.1 The HILDA dataset is a longitudinal database that contains a 
rich array of individual and household level information on key demographic, labour market and 
housing market measures; it also provides information on individuals’ family background, such 
as parents’ labour market and occupational status and parents’ educational attainment. The 
HILDA data has been collected annually since 2001 and 13 waves of data are available for 
analysis. 
The first empirical analysis (Chapter 4) examines the tenure outcomes for individuals/ 
households in 2010 or wave 10 of the HILDA data. The approach adopted is a propensity 
score methodology (PSM) which allows the effect of some ‘event’ or ‘treatment’, such as the 
receipt of a bequest or transfer (hereafter referred to as the treatment group), to be robustly 
measured when selection into a treatment is not randomly assigned. For instance, it is 
conceivable that a person with a large number of siblings will have lower chances of receiving 
a parental gift or bequest as compared to a person who is an only child because their parents 
are less able to assist when there is a large number of children in a household. The PSM 
allows us to compare ‘like-with-like’ by identifying a control group of individuals who did not 
receive a bequest/transfer, but who have personal characteristics similar to those of the 
treatment group of individuals who did receive a bequest/transfer over the study timeframe. 
The method attributes any difference in housing outcomes between control and treatment 
groups to the effect of the bequest/transfer. The analysis will address research questions 1 and 
2 and focus on the role of intergenerational transfers in the form of bequests or parental 
transfers on housing outcomes at a point in time. 
The second empirical analysis (Chapter 5) presents the results from an analysis of first home 
ownership. In particular, a series of hazard or duration models are estimated and reported that 
identifies the determinants of entry into first home ownership. As with the analysis in Chapter 4, 
of key interest is the role of the receipt and amount of bequests or parental transfers on 
housing outcomes, in this case first home ownership. In addition, data is presented that shows 
how the receipt of bequests and parental transfers is correlated with the purchase price and 
value of loan for first home buyers. If parental transfers or bequests do in fact affect the 
decisions of first home buyers, then adjustment may occur with respect to the timing of the 
purchase, or the size of the house purchased. The analysis in Chapter 5 will shed light on this 
issue and in doing so address research questions 1 and 2. 
The final empirical analysis (Chapter 6) will focus on the impact of intergenerational transfers 
on inequality. Statistical techniques will be applied to selected waves of the HILDA data to 
identify how intergenerational transfers affect the distribution of wealth over time and in doing 
so address research question 3. 
The remainder of the report is set out as follows. In Chapter 2, a discussion of the institutional, 
policy and theoretical context in which the analysis is set against is presented. In effect, 
Chapter 2 will ‘set the scene’ for the remainder of the report by providing context in which the 
                                               
1
 ‘This paper uses unit record data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. 
The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the Australian Government Department of Social Services (DSS) 
and is managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (Melbourne Institute). The 
findings and views reported in this paper, however, are those of the author and should not be attributed to either 
DSS or the Melbourne Institute.’ 
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analysis is conducted and interpreted. Following this, a literature review around the question of 
intergenerational transfers and housing outcomes is set out. The emphasis in this chapter will 
be on existing empirical analyses that have examined the extent of intergenerational transfers 
and their relationship to housing outcomes and distribution of wealth. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will 
contain the empirical analysis described above. In Chapter 7, the policy implications of the 
analysis is described. Finally, in Chapter 8 concluding comments are set out and possible 
avenues for future research flagged. 
The empirical analysis in this report highlights the important role that intergenerational transfers 
make for the observed housing outcomes of Australian households. In particular, we find 
evidence that intergenerational transfers in the form of bequests and parental transfers are 
associated with housing outcomes. The analysis in Chapter 4 identifies a statistically significant 
positive relationship between the receipt of a bequest and home ownership. In particular, the 
receipt of a bequest increases rates of home ownership by between 4 and 8 percentage points. 
While the value of parental transfers is somewhat smaller, the analysis in Chapter 4 also 
identifies large effects of such transfers on home ownership outcomes in Wave 10 of the 
HILDA dataset. It is possible that such a finding reflects the more targeted nature of parental 
transfers in terms of their purpose and timing. In a similar fashion, the duration analysis in 
Chapter 5 finds evidence that receipt of a bequest and parental transfers are associated with 
faster entry into first home ownership. 
There is also evidence that transfers in the form of bequests and inter vivos gifts from parents 
affect the distribution of wealth. These have an important housing dimension as the analysis in 
Chapter 6 finds that renters are less likely to receive transfers. Moreover, the net effect of such 
transfers over the period up to 2010 indicates that they have tended to increase the level of 
inequality. 
The findings in this report highlight some significant policy challenges. While economic theory 
provides insight into what might be the appropriate response in terms of the design of tax and 
transfer policies, there are specific limitations in place in this regard. Those limitations reflect 
current and historical institutional arrangements that mean it is unlikely that a ‘textbook’ 
response is possible. For example, while the economic argument for wealth taxes can be set 
out and the rationale for including the imputed rent from owner-occupied housing in means 
tests may be compelling, historical and institutional arrangements mean such policies response 
are most likely unfeasible. 
What the analysis in this report does highlight is the need for a conversation around the 
‘welfare role’ of housing and housing wealth. Moreover, this discussion should acknowledge 
that housing represents an important intergenerational mechanism whereby advantageous 
outcomes can be extended to the next generation. In doing so it is clear that intergenerational 
transmission of wealth and socio-economic status extend beyond the pathways, such as 
education, which have been acknowledged and studied in the literature previously. In turn, 
targeted policies, such as first home buyer grants, may need to consider how such policies can 
take into account the role played by intergenerational transfers on housing-related outcomes. 
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2 THE HISTORICAL, POLICY AND THEORETICAL 
CONTEXT 
This chapter provides a general overview of historical, institutional and theoretical 
considerations that are critical for understanding the analysis in this report. That is, it provides 
a context and a framework against which the remainder of the report can be read and 
interpreted. The reader is also directed to the Positioning Paper that accompanies this report 
(Barrett et al. 2015) for additional discussion. 
2.1 Institutional and policy considerations 
2.1.1 Historical developments 
Historically, home ownership has been the dominant form of housing tenure in Australia. 
Following the Second World War, the Australian Government actively promoted home 
ownership for a variety of economic and social reasons. After increasing rapidly during the 
1950s, since the early 1960s the home ownership rate has been relatively steady at around 70 
per cent (Kryger 2009). Outright ownership has fluctuated over time so that although around 
one-half of home-owning households were outright owners in 1981, by 2001 that figure had 
increased to around 60 per cent. Traditionally, around 25 per cent of households are tenured in 
private sector rentals and around 5 per cent in public housing. The latter form of tenure in 
particular has been increasingly seen as a residual form of tenure occupied by individuals and 
households with high needs such as the long-term unemployed, sole-parent households and 
the disabled (Jacobs et al. 2010). 
The aggregate trends in housing described above mask some underlying changes in the 
nature of housing tenure in Australia. Yates (2000, 2002) and Flood and Baker (2010) 
document that over the period 1986–2006 there were sustained falls in the rate of home 
ownership among households in the 25–44-year-old age groups of around 15 per cent. Burke 
et al. (2014) have identified how home ownership rates have changed for successive cohorts 
of Australians. The evidence (Table 1 below) points to a substantial decline in the ownership 
rates among younger households over time. For example, among 25–34-year olds, the 
proportion of households in home ownership has declined by one fifth, from over 60 per cent to 
less than 50 per cent over the three decades beginning 1981. A similar, though somewhat less 
pronounced decline, has occurred in the households aged 35–44 years of age. Also of note is 
that although home ownership rates have remained relatively stable for older age groups (45–
54 and 55–64 years of age), outright ownership rates have fallen for these groups over time. 
Such a change may, of course, simply point to transitions to home ownership being delayed as 
opposed to not occurring at all. 
Particular concern has also been expressed that first-time home ownership has become 
increasingly unattainable. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data indicate that the 
proportion of households that are first-time buyers has fallen to historically low levels in recent 
years. In Figure 1 below we show the proportion of first home buyers in Australia and 
separately for New South Wales and Victoria. In New South Wales in particular, where 
affordability issues are cited as being particularly acute, the proportion of first home buyers has 
fallen to around 12 per cent for approximately two years. Similarly, for Australia, the proportion 
of first home buyers has fallen to some of the lowest levels, around 15 per cent, recorded 




Table 1: Home ownership rates, by age cohorts, 1981–2011 
Year Age cohorts Owner Purchaser Home ownership 
1981 
25–34 years 
9.7% 51.7% 61.4% 
1991 14.1% 39.0% 53.1% 
2001 11.3% 40.0% 51.3% 
2011 5.1% 43.3% 48.4% 
1981 
35–44 years 
21.6% 52.7% 74.3% 
1991 28.2% 42.2% 69.4% 
2001 23.2% 45.9% 69.2% 
2011 10.4% 54.9% 65.3% 
1981 
45–54 years 
39.6% 38.7% 78.3% 
1991 46.6% 29.4% 76.0% 
2001 42.3% 35.7% 78.0% 
2011 24.9% 49.1% 74.0% 
1981 
55–64 years 
57.2% 23.4% 80.6% 
1991 66.8% 12.3% 79.1% 
2001 66.7% 15.9% 82.6% 
2011 48.0% 32.2% 80.2% 
Source: Burke, Stone and Ralston (2014) 
Figure 1: First home buyers as a proportion of total home buyers 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using ABS (2015) 
A variety of factors are cited for these developments including the presence of an increasing 
number of investors and dual income childless households in the property market. For some 
groups, such as the low-income older age groups who experienced declining rates of home 
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ownership over the periods 1996–2006 may have been permanently ‘scarred’ by the 
challenging economic circumstances experienced in the decade between 1983 and 1993, 
along with challenges in the housing market such as the high interest rates in the late 1980s. 
Significantly, Flood and Baker (2010) also identify a loss of outright ownership among young 
households; a pattern they suggest may be attributable to decreases in the level of bequests 
received by this group. 
Of course changes in housing outcomes need to be assessed in the context of wider changes 
in the socio-demographic and socio-economic space. Social changes around norms relating to 
marriage, education and career have also changed significantly over the past three decades 
(Flatau et al. 2007). As in other countries, Australians have delayed marriage and fertility 
decisions, and attained increasing levels of education over time. More recently they have also 
tended to remain in the parental home for longer periods (Cobb-Clark & Gorgens 2014). These 
social and economic developments have been cited as important considerations for changes in 
home ownership rates in other countries. In the United States context, Fisher and Gervais 
(2011) note that delays in partnering will mechanically lower home ownership rates while 
increased uncertainty associated with earnings will also tend to reduce the rate of home 
ownership. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, Andrew (2010) highlights the likelihood that 
increased student debt will delay entry into home ownership for future graduates. 
The change in tenure outcomes also reflects changing economic conditions faced by 
households over the past few decades, especially in recent years where house prices have 
increased rapidly in some markets. In Figure 2 below the change in house prices across 
Australia and the capital cities is presented. Though the index does not allow the level of house 
prices to be compared, it does show how prices have changed over time across locations. For 
example, there is clear evidence of the rapid increase in prices in Perth that coincided with the 
mining boom in the mid-2000s, along with the rapid increase in the Sydney market over the 
past three years. 
Figure 2: House price index, Australia and capital cities 2003–14 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using ABS (2015) 
When analysing home ownership in Australia, an important consideration is its function as a 
store of wealth. Traditionally, housing has represented the largest component of a household’s 
asset portfolio and the principal savings vehicle for Australian households (Findlay 2010; 
Headey et al. 2005). For example, notwithstanding the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) between 
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2006 and 2010, the share of real estate in asset holdings for Australian households increased 
from 54 per cent to 60 per cent. As discussed below, there are sound financial and economic 
reasons why housing represents such a significant component of household wealth holdings. 
2.1.2 Policy context—tax and transfer policies 
High levels of home ownership have been considered to be an important objective for 
successive governments over time and this is reflected in a range of policy settings. For 
example, housing assets generally receive generous tax treatment and are treated favourably 
in the context of Australia’s income support framework. Transfers from the government are 
generally non-contributory and heavily means-tested, though the family home is generally 
excluded from any assets test that does apply (Whiteford 2010). In the context of the 
retirement incomes system, home ownership is identified implicitly, if not explicitly, as an 
important means of saving and one of the ‘pillars’ of retirement income (Yates & Bradbury 
2010). 
A variety of tax concessions also apply to owner-occupied housing. Capital gains on owner-
occupied housing are not taxable and nor is the imputed rent on owner occupied housing. 
First-time home buyers generally receive some reduction in stamp duty payable on the 
purchase transaction, though over recent times such concessions have been targeted to the 
buyers constructing new houses (Office of State Revenue 2012). It is also notable that during 
the late 1970s successive governments abolished death duties and gift duties. While applying 
more widely than real property assets, in many cases such taxes would have applied to 
housing assets transferred inter vivos or at death. 
The recent review of the Australian taxation system, the ‘Henry Tax Review’, made some 
recommendations about the treatment of housing including the retention of the means test 
exemption for owner-occupied housing up to a generous threshold (Department of Treasury 
2010). At the same time, no specific recommendation was made about the possible 
reintroduction of a wealth transfer tax such as a tax on bequests. Significantly, a specific 
recommendation was made to replace the existing taxes on the conveyance of land with a 
broad-based land tax, though to date only the Australian Capital Territory has initiated such a 
reform (McLaren 2013). 
The current Commonwealth Government has committed to a wide ranging review of the 
Australian taxation system (Australian Government 2015). Notwithstanding this, it notes ‘that 
there is a strong consensus that it would not be appropriate to tax either the imputed rent on 
owner-occupied housing or capital gains derived from it’ (p.65). This suggests that it is likely 
that owner-occupied housing will retain its tax advantageous status into the future and continue 
to represent an important means by which households can accumulate savings over the life 
cycle. 
It is also the case that government policy has supported home ownership through direct grants 
to first home buyers (FHOG) (Wood et al. 2010). Although originally introduced in 2000 to 
offset, at least partially, the effect of the GST for new home buyers these grants to first-time 
owner occupiers remain. During the GFC the amounts available under the FHOG were 
temporarily increased and more recently the grants have been redirected by the states which 
administer the schemes to focus on the purchase of newly constructed housing (Office of State 
Revenue 2012). The impact of subsidies such as the FHOG scheme have been analysed by a 
number of researchers with the finding that such schemes generally have only a limited impact 
on the attainment of home ownership. While such subsidies relax the deposit gap faced by 
potential home owners, it has little or no impact on the ongoing borrowing constraints faced by 
households and merely serves to bring forward the purchase of housing for those households 
that would have eventually purchased rather than remain in the private rental market (Wood et 
al. 2010). Moreover, there is the potential for such subsidies to be captured by the supply side 
of the market (Dungey et al. 2011). 
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2.2 Theoretical context 
The analysis in this project is quantitative in nature and relies on an economic framework. In 
the Positioning Paper (Barrett et al. 2015) an extended discussion was set out that described 
the nature of the economic approach and how it could be usefully applied to understand and 
analyse the processes of interest in the current report. The interested reader is directed to that 
publication for a more detailed discussion of the economic approach to analysing economic 
decisions and outcomes. Below is an abridged version of that discussion. 
From an economic perspective, agents (individuals or households) are assumed to ‘optimise’ 
or make the best possible choices subject to the constraints they face. In the current context, 
the constraints that a household or individuals may face could include the level of income they 
earn or credit market constraints that limit the amount of borrowing that can be undertaken 
against expected future earnings. In this setting, interest is generally focused on how behaviour 
and outcomes change when the constraints that agents face vary. The models are generally 
somewhat simplified abstractions of what is happening in the real world, though economic 
models are generally a rich source of testable hypotheses. 
2.2.1 A basic model 
The general approach in economics is to argue that economic agents make the best possible 
decisions given the constraints that they face. 2  The manner in which this is usually 
conceptualised is that agents maximise utility subject to a budget constraint. Typically, agents 
are assumed to consume a bundle or set of goods that are denoted as x . Here, x  may consist 
of a bundle of goods such as food, clothing and shelter or housing. In general, economists 
argue that if the size of x  increases, that is the bundle of goods that an agent consumes 
increase, then utility also increases. 
Agents are generally constrained from consuming unlimited amounts of goods and services. 
The most important constraint and the one that can be readily identified is the budget 
constraint. In short, with a limited income (which we refer to as m ), agents only have so much 
to spend on the items they may wish to consume. Total expenditure on all goods must be less 
than or equal to income ( m ). We can then think of the economic agent’s problem as that of 
maximising utility subject to their budget constraint. For example, households will choose 
quantities of food (f), clothing (c) and housing (h) so as to maximise utility subject to the budget 
constraint. More formally, we can write the following problem: 





where x  is a vector representing the quantities of food, clothing and housing consumed. 
This description of the economic approach is clearly highly stylised. It considers only three 
goods for instance. Likewise, there is no provision for saving in the model where an agent may 
defer consumption until a later period, or use borrowings to bring consumption forward in time. 
Clearly, such a consideration is pertinent for housing where purchases of housing services are 
often associated with the use of a loan (mortgage). One manner by which such considerations 
can be introduced into a model is through a life-cycle model. 
2.2.2 A life-cycle model 
A ‘life-cycle’ model captures the notion that individuals age over time and undertake very 
different economic activities at different stages of life. Young individuals tend to invest in 
                                               
2
 Throughout the discussion we will refer to ‘economic agents’ without identifying exactly the nature of the who or 
what is an ‘agent’. In many cases decisions are made by individuals, in other cases, decisions are made by 
‘households’. In the empirical analysis the analysis will examine the outcomes for both individuals and households 
depending on the analysis being undertaken. 
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human capital by acquiring education. Following a period during which they enter the labour 
force and save, they will generally retire and draw down accumulated wealth. Both the 
behaviours and the constraints faced during each stage of the life-cycle differ. These changes 
are often associated with important life events such as marriage and the birth of children which 
also coincide with housing-related decisions. The life-cycle model attempts to capture these 
important changes and identify the implications for economic behaviours and outcomes. 
The simplest way to extend the basic model described above is to incorporate life-cycle 
considerations into a two or more period model. For example, suppose that agents live for two 
periods, 10  tandt .3 In the first period, individuals choose not only how much to consume 
but also how much to save. Saving is important because in the second period individuals do 
not work and the amount of resources available for consumption might simply consist of 
earnings from accumulated saving and the savings themselves. Moreover, if individuals can 
choose how much they wish to work in the first period, 0t , then decisions around work effort 
(and hence income levels) and savings choices can be identified from the model. 















where 0c  is consumption in period 0; 1c  is consumption in the second period; 0y  is the first 
period income; 1y  is second period income, and r  is the interest rate. In this case, the inter-
temporal budget constraint simply requires that lifetime consumption is less than or equal to 
lifetime income. Consumption can be moved across periods by saving and borrowing. 
It is important to include this temporal aspect into models of economic behaviour that consider 
choices around housing, since housing is an asset that if purchased in t=0 provides a stream of 
services that can be consumed in t=1. While housing services can be purchased like other 
services in the rental market, home ownership generally involves large lumpy expenditures 
financed by borrowing in capital markets. 
One relevant feature of borrowing and savings in capital markets is noteworthy. The nature of 
capital markets means that loans must generally be backed by collateral and this generally 
introduces an important constraint facing most households, namely an inability to borrow 
against future earnings. These capital market imperfections mean that households often face 
credit or collateral constraints. The inability to borrow against future income streams may mean 
that a household is constrained and therefore cannot purchase the desired level of housing 
(Zeldes 1989). 
The simple multi-period model described above can be generalised in a way that highlights 
how the issue of intergenerational transfers, the focus of this study, can be explored. 
2.2.3 Overlapping generations model 
Overlapping generation models analyse economies consisting of a series of ‘generations’. 
Consider a life-cycle model in which individuals ‘live’ for three periods. At a given point in time 
there may be a ‘young cohort’ composed of dependent children who are accumulating human 
capital through schooling; a ‘middle cohort’ composed of working households with dependent 
children; and, an ‘old cohort’ who have retired and whose consumption is financed by 
accumulated savings. In such economies, cohorts progressively age so the young cohort in 
                                               
3
 Here the two periods might be considered to represent the period of one’s life when they are working  0t  and 
the period when they are retired  1t . A more complex model would have additional periods such as when one is 
investing in education. 
 
 14 
this period becomes the ‘middle-aged’ cohort in the following period. Similarly, the old cohort 
‘die’ in the following period. 
Where economic agents (individuals or households) have children, the welfare of those 
children directly or indirectly impact on the wellbeing of the parent. For example, parents who 
are concerned about the future incomes of children may make investments in their child’s 
education. Alternatively, they may transfer resources to the children through a gift or a loan if 
the child faces capital market constraints. Similarly, old households that will ‘die’ in the 
following period may increase the welfare of their children (the ‘middle cohort’) by bequeathing 
some assets upon their death. 
The transfers identified may be in the form of inter vivos gifts or loans, or they may be 
associated with bequests. There is an extensive literature that examines the motivations 
behind such transfers (Laferrère & Wolff 2006). These may include altruism, exchange 
motives, demonstration effects and insurance motives (Cox 1987). In general, such models 
extend beyond what is required for an understanding of the behaviours and outcomes 
considered in this report. Nonetheless, at an intuitive level the potential implications of inter 
vivos transfers and bequests can be readily understood. 
Consider, for example, an inter vivos transfer from a parent to an adult child. Recall that the 
life-cycle model requires that lifetime consumption be no greater than lifetime resources or 
income. An unanticipated transfer effectively increases the expected lifetime income of the 
child and allows for greater consumption opportunities over the remainder of the recipient’s life. 
This may, for example, lead to an increase in housing consumption through the purchase of a 
larger house. Alternatively, if the child had been constrained by credit market imperfections that 
meant they were unable to purchase housing, the transfer may relax this constraint and allow 
the child to increase the amount of housing consumed or do so sooner by reducing the time 
required to save for a down-payment. An unanticipated transfer represents an income shock in 
the context of the life-cycle model that allows higher consumption during the remainder of an 
individual’s life. In effect, the transfer represents an unexpected increase in lifetime income and 
it might be expected that such a positive shock will lead to increased consumption of all goods 
including housing services over the recipient’s lifetime. 
It is important to emphasise that there are a number of alternative mechanisms by which such 
transfers might impact on economic behaviours (Guiso & Jappelli 2002; Mayer & Engelhardt 
1996). Households that receive transfers may, for example, reduce their own savings. 
Alternatively, the transfer may be used to supplement the recipients own savings and thereby 
increase the value of the housing services consumed by purchasing a larger house or better 
quality house. Housing purchase decisions may also be brought forward in time by 
supplementing the recipient's own savings with the transfer and relaxing the down payment 
constraint that purchasers generally face. Alternatively, the transfer may be simply used to 
increase the level of deposit or down-payment that a household puts down, thereby reducing 
the mortgage repayments they face. 
In some cases transfers may be anticipated and such transfers are likely to have different 
implications for observed behaviours and outcomes. In the case of bequests for example, it 
may be the case that they are anticipated though the exact timing and amount is unknown. 
Similarly, children may (correctly) expect that parents will make inter vivos transfers at some 
point, though the size and timing remains unknown. 
There are a number of avenues through which an anticipated transfer may change economic 
behaviours. For example, consider a household that is credit constrained but is anticipating a 
transfer in the future. Current consumption of housing services may increase if the transfer 
means that a deposit constraint is less likely to be binding in the future. It is important to note 
that anticipated transfers are also likely to have more nuanced implications for economic 
behaviour and outcomes beyond those directly related to housing decisions. For example, 
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anticipation of a large transfer in the future may lead to an individual investing less in acquiring 
human capital or education. In turn, consumption may be higher in earlier stages in the life-
cycle (other things being equal) in the expectation that lifetime resources will be boosted by the 
receipt of the (anticipated) transfer later in the life-cycle. More generally, a household that 
anticipates receipt of an inter vivos transfer or bequest may save less in the current period and 
increase consumption of all goods, not just housing, in the future. In effect, an anticipated 
transfer relaxes the lifetime constraint by increasing expected lifetime income. 
It is also important to note that by incorporating bequests and other transfers into an 
overlapping generations (OLG) model it is possible to identify how the distribution of wealth 
and inequality may evolve over time (Gokhale et al. 2001). 
The discussion above has been general in nature and has presented the intuition associated 
with the relationship between intergenerational transfers and housing and related economic 
outcomes. In the next chapter, we discuss existing evidence on the impact of transfers on 
outcomes, with particular reference to housing outcomes. 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
A detailed literature review was set out in the Positioning Paper for this project (Barrett et al. 
2015). The short literature survey set out below highlights some key studies around the same 
themes that the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 through to Chapter 6 address, along with some 
studies not identified in Barrett et al. (2015). With most of the literature dealing with 
international evidence, it is important to understand that policy implications are likely to be 
heavily dependent on the institutional framework being considered. For example, the empirical 
evidence discussed below highlights how in some countries intergenerational transfers reflect 
social norms whereby resources are pooled across generations; in other countries the 
transfers are important in a context where credit markets are poorly developed. Likewise, tax 
policies are likely to be an important determinant of the extent and form that transfers take. 
While the Australian context has been described briefly in Chapter 2, it is important to keep this 
in mind when considering the empirical evidence described below. 
3.1 International evidence 
3.1.1 The nature and magnitude of transfers 
In general, there is limited evidence around the extent of intergenerational transfers and the 
behavioural implications of those transfers. In most cases such transfers occur within families. 
The lack of empirical evidence around such transfers reflects two considerations. First, that 
economic interest in the importance of transfers is relatively new reflecting a growing 
awareness of the importance of non-market intra-family interactions. While many of these 
transactions have an exchange nature to them, other transfers appear to be purely altruistic in 
nature (Laferrère & Wolff 2006). The second is the lack of data that has been available for 
analysing the nature of transfers and their implications for behaviours and outcomes. 
For the United States, Schoeni (1997) uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to 
examine transfers, both inter vivos and bequests. While such transfers often take the form of 
direct cash transfers or in-kind gifts, Schoeni (1997) also identifies the substantial nature of 
time transfers that occur. For downwards intergenerational transfers, he notes that the 
likelihood that a transfer is received and the amount transferred is positively associated with 
parental wealth. Conversely, for recipients of transfers, the incidence of receipt and the amount 
received is negatively related to household resources. Such a pattern may reflect altruistic or 
insurance motives. That is, parents transfer resources to children as they are concerned about 
the child’s wellbeing, or because the transfer alleviates a shock experienced by the recipient 
household. Similarly, Berry (2008) shows that those individuals who receive financial transfers 
are more likely to be needy. It is noteworthy that the evidence also suggests that recipients are 
less likely to be home owners. McGarry (1999) argues that while inter vivos transfers from 
parents are generally negatively correlated with the recipient’s current income, no such 
relationship exists for bequests. Rather, bequests are more likely to be negatively related to the 
recipient’s permanent or expected lifetime income. 
Zissimopoulos and Smith (2011) present evidence about the transfers made by parents to their 
children in Europe and in doing so compares their behaviour to that of parents in the United 
States. The analysis suggests that transfers in the United States are approximately 50 per cent 
higher than in Europe. Significantly, Zissimopoulos and Smith (2011) note that transfer 
behaviour varies across European countries. These differences appear to reflect differences in 
cultural or social norms, and, institutional and policy settings. For example, there is some 
evidence that public expenditures on family policies is negatively related to parental monetary 
gifts, though the impact is relatively small and does not imply that public expenditures crowd 
out intra-familial transfers. Also in a European context, Emery (2013) highlights the important 
role played by the number of siblings on the likelihood that a child receives a parental transfer. 
The analysis suggests that the number of siblings is substantially more important than parental 
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income in explaining the extent of transfers. In terms of bequests, Karagiannaki (2015) 
documents the magnitude of bequests in Britain over a 35-year period to 2010. The data 
indicate a substantial increase in the value of estate assets passing on death during this 
period, with the increase largely though not solely reflecting the increase in the value of 
housing assets over this time. That is, though housing assets were the main contributor to the 
increase in the value of inheritances over this period, there were also substantial increases in 
financial assets. It is important to note that the proportion of the adult population receiving 
bequests may be considered relatively small in any given year, being approximately 2 per cent 
of the population annually. 
Transfers, especially bequests may also be important for the level of inequality. Zissimopoulos 
and Smith (2011), however, conclude that the average amount of gifts provided to children by 
parents across the countries studied did not appear to be substantial enough to affect wealth 
inequalities across generations. For the United Kingdom, Karagiannaki (2015) found that the 
greater dispersion of inheritances among inheritors tended to increase the level of inequality 
during the period 1985–2010. However, this was offset by an increase in the proportion of the 
population that actually received large inheritances. 
3.1.2 The impact of transfers on housing and related outcomes 
A number of studies have sought to identify the various mechanisms by which 
intergenerational transfers may impact on housing-related decisions. Recall that housing-
related decisions such as the timing of home purchase, the size of mortgage borrowings and 
the quantity of housing services may all be affected by the receipt of transfers. For the United 
States, Engelhardt and Mayer (1998) find evidence of transfers affecting housing decisions on 
multiple dimensions. Recipients of transfers generally spend a shorter period saving for down 
payments or deposits and reducing their own saving for every dollar in transfers received. In 
addition, there is evidence that the down payment is higher among transfer recipients, and the 
value of the house purchased is higher. Luea (2008) provides more recent evidence and finds 
that recipients of intergenerational transfers are 1.2 times more likely to purchase a home 
compared to non-recipients with the largest impact on those who receive relatively large 
transfers. There is also evidence that the amount of housing services purchased increased 
with the value of the transfer, but do not necessarily reduce the mortgage burden incurred. 
Analysis for Europe is more nuanced, reflecting the variety of institutional regimes and social 
norms across countries. Kurz (2004) considers home ownership outcomes for successive birth 
cohorts in West Germany. Though a direct measure of inheritances is not available, the 
analysis indicates that the children of home owners are more likely themselves to transition into 
home ownership. Clearer evidence of the relationship between intergenerational transfers and 
tenure outcomes is provided for Italy by Guiso and Jappelli (2002) who find that transfers 
(bequests and inter vivos gifts) have only a small impact on the time spent saving for a down 
payment. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that entry into home ownership in Italy 
generally occurs much later than in other countries, with home ownership rates peaking just 
prior to retirement. For Ireland, Duffy and Roche (2007) find that around one-third of 
households receive an inter vivos transfer and the transfer represented 21 per cent of the down 
payment for a newly purchased home. Spilerman and Wolff (2012) note that parental transfers 
impact on both the likelihood that individuals are home owners and the amount of housing 
consumed in France. 
There is also evidence around the intergenerational transfers for North European countries. 
Using a large administrative dataset for Danish households, Kolodziejczyk and Leth-Petersen 
(2013) find little evidence that intergenerational transfers are used to support home ownership. 
For the Netherlands, Mulder and Smits (2013) report that around 9 per cent of individuals 
receive financial support for home ownership from parents. It is noteworthy that there is little 
evidence that financial support from parents was based on the child’s needs, nor that support 
was directed explicitly towards support for ownership per se. 
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Two other types of analysis are relevant for understanding the relationship between 
intergenerational transfers and housing outcomes. The first utilise changes in tax laws that may 
directly or indirectly affect transfers and housing outcomes. Yututake et al. (2011) model the 
relationship between transfers and housing-related decisions using Japanese data that relies 
on changes in tax policies around gifts designed to encourage investment in housing. The 
analysis indicates that a reduction in taxes associated with gifts for the purpose of acquiring a 
residence does in fact lead to higher investment in housing. Nonetheless, its net impact is 
relatively small. Japelli et al. (2014) also exploit policy changes to identify how 
intergenerational transfers in Italy are impacted by the abolition of transfer taxes, namely gift 
and bequests. They find evidence that the likelihood of making transfers is negatively related to 
transfer taxes. That is, the reduction of taxes tended to increase the likelihood that real assets 
are transferred across generations. 
The second type of study of interest focuses on the effect of transfers on the accumulation of 
wealth. For the United States, Boehm and Schlottmann (2001) find that children of home 
owners are more likely to enter into home ownership. Moreover, higher levels of education of 
children leads to greater levels of housing and non-housing wealth accumulation for the 
children of home owners. Interestingly, they find that low-income households accumulate less 
wealth over the period for every dollar in gifts received compared to higher income households. 
A study by Wolff and Gittleman (2014) found that between 1989 and 2007 the proportion of 
households reporting the receipt of inter vivos transfers increased by almost fourfold, from 1 
per cent to almost 4 per cent. Moreover, the value of gifts increased substantially during this 
period. It is notable that no such trends were observed for bequests over this period. The 
analysis of transfers, both bequests and inter vivos, suggested they tended to be equalising or 
inequality reducing. Although wealthier households tended to receive greater transfers, they 
were smaller in a proportional sense than those received by less wealthy households. 
Table A1 in the Appendices of the Positioning Paper (Barrett et al. 2015) provides a summary 
of the key findings identified in the international literature cited above as well as Australian 
studies covered in the next section. 
3.2 Australian evidence 
For Australia, evidence on the extent of and impact of intergenerational transfers is limited. An 
early study by O’Dwyer (2001) used data on deceased estates to examine the frequency with 
which individuals receive bequests, especially those related to property. The study did identify 
some interesting patterns. For example, older households generally hold lower levels of 
housing assets than younger cohorts. This reflects a cohort effect, with younger households 
experiencing higher lifetime incomes that are reflected in their wealth holdings, including 
property. Moreover, older cohorts have generally entered into the dissaving segment of the life-
cycle and experience declining levels of wealth including housing wealth. 
Similar to the United Kingdom (Karagiannaki 2015), O’Dwyer (2001) finds that few households 
receive a bequest on an annual basis. Moreover, as bequests are usually divided among living 
descendants, it is argued that labour market outcomes are likely to be more important than 
inheritances in determining life chances and the distribution of wealth. Nonetheless, it is the 
case that individuals in occupations that may be considered more prestigious, such as 
managers, tend to receive higher bequests than those who are less skilled. Moreover, those 
inheritances are themselves positively correlated with the housing wealth of beneficiaries. This 
suggests that it is possible that the transfers of wealth via bequests may exacerbate existing 
inequalities over time. 
King and McDonald (1999) examine intergenerational transfers using the ABS Survey of 
Families 1992. The data also provides some information on the provision of gifts or loans for 
the purchase of property. Assistance with home or land purchase peaks at ages 30–35 years 
for recipients and around 5.5 per cent of respondents report receiving this type of transfer in 
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the previous 10 years. Inheritances are reported to be received by around 3 per cent of the 
population in the previous 10 years, peaking at the age of 50–60 years as parents pass away. 
The value of inheritances also tends to be substantially higher than the average value of gifts 
or loans. Overall, the evidence suggests that inter-household/inter-family transfers are 
common, and have a potentially important influence on the housing careers of recipients. 
 
 20 
4 ATTAINMENT OF HOME OWNERSHIP AND OUTRIGHT 
OWNERSHIP; A PROPENSITY SCORE APPROACH 
In this chapter we ask the following key research questions: 
 Is the receipt of a bequest (gift) from parents positively associated with home ownership 
status? 
 Does the receipt of a bequest (gift) from parents ease transitions to outright home 
ownership? 
These questions were investigated in the Positioning Paper and addressed using a sample of 
individuals aged 25–65 years in wave 10 (2010) of the HILDA data. Their 2010 tenure 
outcomes, and the role of bequests and transfers, was explored in a series of probit models 
that relate tenure choice to the observable characteristics of individuals. The tenure choice 
models had the following specification: 
 
where  is a measure of tenure status in 2010 equal to 1 if the individual is a home owner (in 
wave 10), or zero otherwise;  is a vector of socio-demographic and socio-economic 
variables (as measured in 2010) that capture some of the key determinants of housing tenure, 
and  is a measure of the receipt of a parental transfer or bequest that takes the value 1 if 
one or more bequests (parental transfers) were received between 2002 and 2010, zero 
otherwise. In other models that were estimated, the vector  captures the value of the 
parental transfers or bequests that is received. 
Results from the probit analysis suggested that receipt of bequests increases the likelihood 
that individuals attain home ownership. They also confirmed the role of bequests in 
accelerating the achievement of outright ownership. We found statistically significant but 
modest effects. For example, we predicted that receipt of a bequest over the previous nine-
year period lifts the probability of being in home ownership by 2–4 percentage points, with an 
even larger impact on the likelihood of attaining outright home ownership. The larger effect on 
outright ownership might reflect the later stage of the life cycle at which bequests are typically 
received; in other words, bequests are often received after first home ownership has been 
achieved.4 
Despite receipt earlier in the life cycle, model specifications that included the receipt of gifts 
suggest that they are a less important influence on tenure status in wave 10. In general, there 
is no evidence that the receipt of a gift per se is associated with a higher probability that the 
individual is observed in home ownership. 
In this Final Report we offer findings from an alternative methodology to the tenure choice 
modelling approach that is based on improved measures of the socio-economic and 
demographic controls employed in our probit models.5 The propensity score matching (PSM) 
approach we invoke here mimics the methods of a randomised control trial. In the social 
sciences it is generally impossible to undertake randomised experiments allowing for well-
defined treatment and control groups. However, in the medical sciences the conduct of 
randomised trials is routine; for example, new drugs are invariably trialed by taking a group of 
patients who are willing to participate in a trial and suffer the same medical ailment. A 
randomly-selected ‘treatment’ group receive the drug while the remaining patients receive a 
placebo; patients do not know whether they receive the placebo or the drug. The randomised 
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 For a detailed presentation and discussion of these findings, see pp.28–30 of Barrett et al. (2015). 
5
 See Appendix Table A1 where variable definitions are listed. 







nature of the trial ensures that the treatment and control groups will not differ on any 
observable or unobservable variables that might also affect medical outcomes. Bequests and 
parental transfers are non-randomly distributed across the population because there are 
personal characteristics that result in some individuals being more likely to receive these 
intergenerational transfers. For example, a person with a large number of siblings will have 
lower chances of receiving a parental gift or bequest, all else being equal. These 
characteristics could be correlated with the outcome of interest, such as housing tenure, and 
hence ‘contaminate’ comparison of outcomes across a group receiving a bequest (parental 
transfer) and a group that does not receive a bequest (parental transfer). 
The propensity score approach invoked in this chapter imitates a key property of randomised 
trials by selecting a control group of non-recipients that are statistically equivalent or similar to 
recipients in respect of key personal characteristics. The goal is to ensure that the control 
(counterfactual) sample is a replica of the treatment group in terms of its (pre-treatment) 
observable socio-economic and demographic characteristics. In randomised trials equivalence 
on observables is accompanied by treatment and control groups that will not also differ with 
respect to unobservable variables. Thus, if the same attribute transfers to the PSM method, it 
corrects for any systematic unmeasured differences that mean some individuals are 
predisposed to receive parental transfers, and where these unmeasured differences are also 
correlated with home ownership status. Comparisons of housing tenure outcomes between 
counterfactual and treatment samples can then be attributed to the effect of the ‘treatment on 
the treated’. The PSM method therefore addresses sources of selection bias that a simple 
tenure choice model does not deal with. In the next section we explain the steps taken in order 
to execute this research approach. 
4.1 Data, methodological issues and sample specification 
4.1.1 Methodology 
The analysis of home ownership status uses all persons aged 25–65 years with a reported 
tenure status in 2010. Home ownership is identified by answers to the following HILDA survey 
question: 
Which household members are the legal owners of the property? 
Results for both the 25–65 age group and the younger 25–45 years of age subsample are 
reported. The two samples reflect differences in the underlying processes of interest in this 
report. For younger individuals, the effect of bequests is potentially greater given entry into first 
home ownership generally occurs during this part of the life-cycle. Conversely, it is generally 
the case that bequests are less common among this set of younger individuals. A further 
consideration relates to housing tenure patterns that have been identified elsewhere in the 
literature. While it has been common to assume that once home ownership has been achieved 
it is secured for the rest of the life cycle, evidence is suggesting that such a presumption is no 
longer valid in contemporary housing markets (Wood et al. 2013b). Bequests might then help 
ex-owners return to home ownership. 
Though gifts are typically smaller than bequests, they are received earlier in the life cycle when 
first transitions into home ownership are made. A separate inquiry is conducted into the role of 
gifts. Analyses of outright ownership status are again conducted on all persons with a reported 
tenure status in 2010. As with home ownership status, results are reported for both the 25–65 
age range as well as the younger 25–45 year subsample, and a separate PSM exercise is 
conducted for bequests and gifts. 
Application of the PSM method proceeds in four steps. The first step requires estimation of a 
probit model of the probability of receiving a bequest (gift). A rich range of potential recipient 
socio-economic and demographic variables is augmented by key family characteristics, such 
as the number of siblings as well as variables representing parental background. The probit 
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model coefficient estimates play a critical role as they are used to generate the predicted 
conditional probability of receiving a bequest (gift) for each member of the sample. 6  This 
conditional probability is commonly referred to as the propensity score. Rather than matching 
on an individual characteristic, the PSM method uses the propensity score so that matching is 
achieved on a vector of personal characteristics. The analysis used a series of three matching 
algorithms. 
The nearest neighbour algorithm involves matching a member of the group receiving a bequest 
(gift) with a person who did not receive a bequest, but has an estimated propensity score 
closest to that of the recipient. The chosen match is returned to the sample and is therefore 
available as a potential match for each remaining bequest (gift) beneficiary. 7  A second 
approach, the radius (with caliper) method, proceeds with the same matching process as in 
nearest neighbour, but discards the match if the difference in propensity scores exceeds some 
limit (the caliper). Controls that fail the caliper threshold are added back and can therefore be 
chosen as a match for some other recipient of a bequest. The radius method does not use 
recipients of a bequest that do not have a close neighbour. The third approach is commonly 
referred to as the kernel matching approach. It departs from the first two algorithms by utilising 
all observations in the control group to construct the matched control sample, rather than only 
selecting a subsample of them. It assigns weights to each observation within the control group 
that are proportional to the distance between the propensity score for non-treated person i and 
treated person j; a higher weight is placed on control observations that are nearer to the 
treatment group in terms of their propensity score, and less weight on those more distant 
(Caliendo 2005). 
Once a matched set of controls has been formed, a series of post-estimation diagnostics are 
applied. They include t-tests on each characteristic to detect statistically significant differences 
in the mean values of characteristics between treatment (those inheriting or accepting a gift) 
and matched control (non-beneficiary) groups, and a standardised bias test (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin 1985). A standardised bias test indicates the reduction in bias attributable to matching; it 
is measured by first estimating the standardised residual which is simply the difference in 
means between the treatment and unmatched control sample for variable x divided by the 
standard deviation of the pooled sample. The standardised residual is then recalculated for 
each variable, only this time the numerator is the difference in means in variable x between the 
treated and matched control group while the denominator remains as the standard deviation for 
the pooled sample. Differences in the standardised residuals between the matched and 
unmatched samples for each variable offer a measure of the percentage reduction in bias due 
to matching. As a general rule of thumb, balance in the covariates is achieved when the 
standardised bias in the matched sample is less than 25 per cent (Rubin 2001). If these 
balancing tests fail, the probit model is re-estimated using an alternative specification and this 
process is repeated until the balancing tests are passed. Following this, the average effect of 
bequests (gifts) on the individuals receiving bequests (gifts) is calculated as the difference 
between their home ownership rate and the home ownership rate among the matched 
counterfactual control group. This is commonly referred to as the average treatment effect on 
the treated. 
4.1.2 Data 
We begin by describing the key features of the sample used in the PSM analysis (Table 2 
below). Approximately two-thirds of the 25–65-year old survey participants were home owners 
in 2010, a share roughly the same as in the Australian population.8 The proportion of home 
owners among the younger group is, as expected, somewhat lower (54%). The difference in 
                                               
6
 See Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix for a list of variable definitions and model estimates, respectively. 
7
 This procedure is typically referred to as nearest neighbour with replacement. 
8
 This figure is similar to that reported in Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013). 
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mortgagor status is not as large at 43 per cent (25–65-year olds) and 47 per cent (25–45-year 
old), a pattern that most likely reflects the sharp increase in indebtedness among those 
approaching retirement in recent times (Wood et al. 2013b). Further, outright ownership is 
uncommon among the younger age group (7%) as renting is a much more common form of 
tenure (46%) Around 10 per cent of the 25–65 years of age sample received a bequest 
between 2002 and 2010, with a large majority receiving just one bequest.9 Gifts from parents 
are less commonly received at 5 per cent of all 25–65-year-old survey participants, though 
such transfers are somewhat more frequent among the younger participants (7.3%). In 
contrast, bequests reach a lower 6.7 per cent in this younger age group. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, PSM sample 
 Aged 25–65 in 2010 Aged 25–45 in 2010 
 Count % Count % 
Bequest recipient, 2002–10
a
 682 9.3 245 6.7 
Gift recipient, 2002–10
b,c
 367 5.1 264 7.3 
Home owner 2010 4,698 64.3 2,017 54.4 
Outright h/owners 2010 1,537 21.1 271 7.3 
Mortgagor 2010 3,161 43.3 1,746 47.1 
Renter/living rent free in 2010 2,604 35.7 1,688 45.6 
Sample size 7,302 3,705 
Source: Authors' own calculations, wave 1–10 HILDA. 
Note:  
a
 Mean and median amount of bequest received between 2002–10 was $82 444 and $29 000, respectively.  
b
 Mean and median amount of parental gifts/transfers received between 2002–10 was $29 382 and $10 500, 
respectively. 
c
 Only includes persons who received a parental gift/transfer amounting to $5000 or more. 
4.2 Empirical estimates 
4.2.1 Housing pathways and bequests 
Table 3 below presents the findings with respect to achievement of home ownership status in 
2010. Consider first the 25–65-year old PSM samples. Note that the positive effect found in the 
positioning paper using a probit model is also identified using the PSM methodology. Using the 
PSM methodology, the analysis indicates that receipt of a bequest increases home ownership 
rates among beneficiaries by between 4 and 8 percentage points.10 
Consider first the measured effects obtained from application of the nearest neighbour 
algorithm. In the group benefiting from a bequest (the ‘treatment’ rate of home ownership) 
there is a 73 per cent rate of ownership, compared to 69 per cent in the matched non-
beneficiary (control) group. This represents a 4 percentage point difference or 6 per cent of the 
rate in the matched control group. The rates of ownership in the treatment and matched control 
group are higher than in the all sample (25–65 years) design. This is because the ownership 
rates of heirs are boosted by their inheritance, and the control has been chosen such that their 
observable personal characteristics are statistically indistinguishable. The higher rates of 
ownership among the matched control suggest that heirs have personal characteristics, 
                                               
9
 85 per cent of bequest recipients received a single bequest between waves 2002–10. 
10
 The balancing tests are satisfied using the first round probit model estimates. Tests for balance in the covariates 
between the treatment and control groups are illustrated in Figure A1 in Appendix. Given space considerations, we 
only present the balancing estimates for the Radius Matching with Caliper method. Balancing test diagnostics for the 
nearest neighbour and kernel matching algorithms are available from the authors upon request. 
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including income and employment, that would make them more likely than the remainder of the 
25–65-year sample to become home owners even in the absence of a bequest. 
Alternative matching algorithms offer estimates of a similar order of magnitude, though 
somewhat larger, and also statistically significant (in contrast with the nearest neighbour 
difference in ownership rates which is insignificant). A larger impact is also found for the 
younger age group (25–45 years of age) where first transitions into home ownership are 
typically made. This is despite the lower incidence of bequests among the young (7% of the 
25–45-year group receive bequests, but 12% do so in the 45–65 year group). It is also possible 
that the average size of any bequest differs among these groups. Home ownership rates 
among beneficiaries are increased by 7 percentage points (13%) from 53 per cent to 60 per 
cent using the nearest neighbour algorithm, and similar though slightly smaller effects are 
detected using alternative algorithms, and again the differences using alternative algorithms 
are statistically significant. The larger effect among the young reflects a higher propensity to 
inherit while still renting or living in the parental home. In the older age cohort bequests are 
more likely to be received after making a transition into home ownership. This conjecture is 
strongly supported by the HILDA data; a little over three-quarters (77%) of 45–65-year old 
beneficiaries were already home owners, and this age group more frequently receive bequests 
anyway. Even in the younger 25–45-year age group, nearly one-half (47%) were home owners 
before inheritance. 











































Source: Authors' own calculations, wave 1–10 HILDA.  t-stats reported in brackets. 
Bequests and their possible effects on pathways into mainstream or outright ownership are 
presented in Table 4 below. We might expect home buyers receiving a bequest after a first 
move into home ownership to use at least some of their windfall to pay down mortgages and 
accelerate transitions into mainstream ownership. The (nearest neighbour) findings offer 
compelling evidence in support of this hypothesis. Among the non-beneficiary controls aged 
25–65 years, mainstream ownership is reached by only 23 per cent; in comparison 33 per cent 
of bequest recipients no longer had an outstanding mortgage in 2010. The 10 percentage point 
difference is equivalent to a 43 per cent increase when calculated with respect to the control 
rate of outright ownership. Since bequests are less likely among the 25–45 years cohort, and 
outstanding mortgages are generally larger, the acceleration into mainstream ownership due to 
inheritances is less pronounced with a 6 percentage point difference, though this is from a 
lower base of just 6 per cent in the matched control group and therefore represents a doubling 
of the rate in the control group.11 
                                               
11
 Findings are again similar using the other algorithms. 
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Source: Authors' own calculations, wave 1–10 HILDA.  t-stats reported in brackets. 
4.2.2 Housing pathways and parental transfers 
The median parental transfer of $10 500 is significantly smaller than the median bequest 
($29 000); and only 6 per cent of the sample received gifts compared to approximately 8 per 
cent that reported the receipt of a bequest. These statistics suggest that gifts will have more 
limited impacts compared to bequests. However, it is also true that gifts are likely to be timed to 
coincide with specific needs of children, including around home ownership decisions. The 
summary statistics indicate that parental transfers are marginally more common among the 
young 25–45 age group (7%). This stage in the life cycle is commonly associated with first 
transitions into home ownership. 
Table 5 below presents evidence around the possible impacts on home ownership status 
employing the sample of 25–65 year old individuals with a reported tenure status in 2010.12 
Consider the findings obtained using the nearest neighbour method. In the 25–65 year age 
group the rate of home ownership is 53 per cent in the matched control and 67 per cent in the 
‘treatment’ group that receive gifts. The 14 percentage point increase is large—representing a 
26 per cent increase evaluated at the matched control’s ownership rate. Estimates are similar 
when using alternative algorithms.13 
These impacts of the ‘treatment on the treated’ are larger than those found for bequests using 
the same PSM methods. Interestingly, the 53 per cent ownership rate in the matched control 
group is lower than the 64 per cent ownership rate in the full sample. This indicates that 
recipients of gifts have personal characteristics that leave them less likely to signal home 
ownership status than the rest of the sample—a pattern that is the opposite of that found 
among bequest recipients. 
The percentage point increase in the younger cohort is somewhat higher than that in the full 
sample, and it comes off a lower base. Using the nearest neighbour estimates, the 60 per cent 
home ownership rate among those reporting the receipt of a parental transfer is 15 percentage 
points higher than the 44 per cent rate in the matched control, a 34 per cent proportionate 
increase as measured with respect to the matched control. 
  
                                               
12
 See Appendix Table A3 for probit regression estimates used to estimate the propensity score for parental transfer 
recipients 
13














































Source: Authors' own calculations, wave 1–10 HILDA.  t-stats reported in brackets. 
Note: Only includes persons who received a parental gift/transfer amounting to $5000 or more. 
While gifts can make a substantial contribution to the deposit required on home purchase, and 
therefore relax borrowing constraints, their relatively small value is likely to have a more 
modest effect on paying down outstanding mortgages when compared to bequests. This is 
especially so for the 25–45-year age group, where any outstanding mortgage is likely to be 
large. In Table 6 below we consider how gifts are related to transition into outright ownership. 
Each of the matching algorithms yields estimates of the percentage point increase in rates of 
outright ownership, which vary between 3 and 6 percentage points for the 25–65 years cohort; 
this is around a third of the effect on bequest recipients with mortgages. Transfers also 
accelerate transitions into the mainstream for the young age group by between 4 and 5 
percentage points. 
Table 6: Difference between parental gift* recipients and non-recipients in outright home 










































Source: Authors' own calculations, wave 1–10 HILDA.  t-stats reported in brackets.  
Note: Only includes persons who received a parental gift/transfer amounting to $5000 or more. 
The PSM methodology provides what is arguably a more robust identification of the 
relationship between intergenerational transfers and housing outcomes than was presented in 
the accompanying Positioning Paper for this study. Nonetheless, the results are consistent with 
the results presented in that earlier report. With respect to bequests, we find a statistically 
significant relationship between the receipt of a bequest and home ownership in the order of 
between 4 and 8 percentage points. This effect is more pronounced for the younger cohorts 
(aged 25–45 years) where those receiving a bequest exhibit higher home ownership rates of 
around 8 percentage points. A key benefit of the PSM methodology is that it allows the 
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matched control and treatment groups compared to the full sample. This comparison suggests 
that bequest recipients are more likely to attain home ownership than the rest of the population 
regardless of the receipt of a bequest. 
Given that bequests are often received later in an individual’s (or household’s) housing career, 
it is likely that such transfers will impact on the attainment of outright home ownership. The 
PSM results indicate that a typical inheritance lifts the rate of outright ownership among all 
beneficiaries by between 9 and 11 percentage points. The effect for younger beneficiaries is 
somewhat smaller, between 5 and 6 percentage points. 
The findings from an examination of the impact of parental transfers are somewhat more 
nuanced. Significantly, notwithstanding that gifts are generally smaller than bequests, the 
receipt of a relatively large gift (>$5000) is associated with an increase in rates of home 
ownership (among those receiving gifts) of 13 to 15 percentage points. Moreover, if they had 
not received a gift recipients would be less inclined or able to attain home ownership than the 
rest of the population. Intergenerational transfers of this kind are therefore more likely to reach 
those on the margins of ownership. Further, parental transfers have a statistically significant 
effect on outright ownership status, though this effect is somewhat smaller than that 
experienced by bequest beneficiaries. 
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5 FIRST HOME OWNERSHIP AND INTERGENERATIONAL 
TRANSFERS 
In this chapter, the analysis considers the impact of intergenerational transfers on the 
behaviours of first-time home buyers. This group represents a key constituency who have 
faced an increasingly challenging set of circumstances in housing markets. Notwithstanding 
that interest rates are currently at historically low levels, rapid increases in prices have been 
identified as being a barrier to those households who wish to enter the housing market for the 
first time, especially in inner city markets in Sydney and Melbourne. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the importance of first-time buyers is reflected in the range of policy 
initiatives designed to facilitate entry into the housing market. The analysis presents novel 
results on the relationship between intergenerational transfers and housing-related outcomes 
for this group. Two substantive pieces of analysis are reported. The first extends the work 
presented in the Positioning Paper (Barrett et al. 2015). Recall that the transition analysis 
presented in the Positioning Paper identified the conditional probability that individuals change 
tenure around the time that bequests are received. In doing so, the analysis exploited the panel 
nature of the HILDA data. The evidence in that paper indicated that households that received 
bequests were more likely to transition into home ownership. The duration analysis discussed 
in Section 5.1 generalises this approach to identify how the time until entry into first home 
ownership is related to the receipt of intergenerational transfers over the period covered by the 
HILDA data. 
The second analysis examines decisions around home purchase for those who enter into 
home ownership. In particular, using the detailed information available in HILDA it uses 
regression analysis to identify the relationship between the magnitude of housing loans and the 
house purchase price for first-time buyers, and intergenerational transfers. The regression 
analysis is similar to that presented in Engelhardt and Mayer (1998). Together, the analyses 
provide insight into the different dimensions along which housing-related outcomes may be 
affected by transfers for first-time buyers. 
5.1 Empirical analyses  
5.1.1 Duration models 
The panel nature of the HILDA dataset provides an opportunity to analyse the dynamic nature 
of behaviour and outcomes. In Barrett et al. (2015) the transition from one ‘state’ to another 
over time was considered using transition matrices. In particular, the conditional probability of 
transition from one state (e.g. rental tenure) into an alternative state (e.g. home ownership) 
was considered. That is, the process of interest compared the following: 
 tititi TSS ,1,, ,Pr   
Where tiS ,  is the tenure status in period t  for household i  and tiT ,  identifies if the household 
received a transfer  1, tiT  or not  0, tiT . Hence, the probability of transitioning into an 
alternative tenure status, conditional on the initial tenure status, was examined. 
The duration analysis presented in this chapter generalises this approach and is similar to that 
presented in Guiso and Japelli (2002). In that paper, the time or duration until entry into home 
ownership was analysed. Alternatively, the process in that paper was characterised as an 
analysis of the effect of transfers on the time spent saving before entering into home 
ownership. The analysis in this chapter focuses on economic agents that have not previously 
entered into home ownership and considers the time until a transition into first home ownership 
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occurs.14 Of key interest is how the transition into first home ownership is affected by the 
receipt and or value of an intergenerational transfer such as a bequest or parental gift. 
The transition from one state (e.g. rental tenure) into another state (e.g. home ownership) is 
often modelled using the hazard rate. The hazard rate methodology can be conceptualised by 
considering a group of households that have not yet entered into home ownership. Each of 
these households can be considered ‘at risk’ of transitioning into another state, namely home 
ownership. Consider a period such as one year. The hazard rate is the proportion of those 
households which at the start of each year have not entered into first-time home ownership but 
do so by the end of the year. The hazard rate is a conditional probability—that is, it is the 
proportion of households (or individuals) which transition into first-time ownership conditional 
on being eligible to experience first-time home ownership. Intuitively, the hazard rate lies 
between 0 and 1, with a higher hazard rate indicating that the conditional probability of 
transitioning into home ownership is greater. 
When a set of households or individuals is observed for an extended duration, it is possible to 
identify how the hazard rate changes over time. Again, consider a set of economic agents 
(households or individuals) at risk of entering into first home ownership. In some cases, 
observations will not be observed to enter into first home ownership. This may be because the 
data collection period ends prior to transition into the state of interest (first home ownership) or 
because the observation attrites out of the sample prior to the end of the data collection period. 
In this case, the observation is said to be censored. 
In waves 6 and 10 of the HILDA data it is possible to identify households that have not 
previously purchased a home or have done so for the first time since the HILDA was initially 
collected in 2001. It is the transition of these households into first-time home ownership that is 
analysed using duration models. In effect, the hazard or conditional transition into home 
ownership is estimated using econometric techniques that control for observable 
characteristics of the household including the disposable income of the household, the location 
of the household, and the receipt of intergenerational transfers. 
There are a variety of ways in which hazard rates can be modelled from a statistical or 
econometric perspective. Some approaches impose specific functional forms on the hazard 
rate so that it is always increasing or decreasing. The approach adopted in this chapter is one 
that provides maximum flexibility in the shape of the hazard function. In particular, a 
proportional hazard model similar to that described in Meyer (1990) and discussed in 
Lancaster (1990, pp.172–208) is estimated to describe the time until the household enters 
home ownership for the first-time. The form of this hazard function is as follows: 
       'exp0 nn zhh   
where )(nh  is the hazard rate for individual (or household) n , )(0 h  is the ‘baseline’ hazard 
common to all individuals (households), )(nz  is a vector of observable characteristics that 
may vary with time, and   is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
Importantly, duration models such as this allow for the incorporation of non-time varying and 
time-varying covariates which may shift the hazard rate. An example of a non-time varying 
covariate in the case of a household may be the gender of the head of the household. Time-
varying covariates, as their name suggest, may vary over time and could include the receipt (or 
value) of a gift or bequest among other things. 
                                               
14
 The analysis is undertaken for all individuals, for those individuals who remain single or unpartnered during the 
period of analysis, and for couple households. The alternative specifications reflect the likelihood that home 
ownership decisions are often made jointly by individuals within a household setting. Reference to household or 
individual should be taken to mean both types of economic agents. 
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5.1.2 Regression models 
The duration analysis discussed above focuses on the timing of entry into home ownership. 
Intuitively, intergenerational transfers may also affect other aspects of the home ownership 
decision. For example, recipients of transfers may increase the size of the down payment or 
deposit available for the purchase of a home, and in doing so increase the total purchase price 
or decrease the size of the housing loan taken out. In an approach similar to that reported in 
Engelhardt and Mayer (1998), the second analysis in this chapter will consider these two 
additional aspects of the behaviour of first-time home buyers. The first considers how the 
purchase price of housing varies according to the receipt and value of intergenerational 
transfers. Second, regression models that capture the value of the housing loan taken out by 
first-time buyers are also estimated. 
The analysis is this context is a reduced form in character and care should be applied when 
interpreting the regression results as capturing a causal relationship. Rather, they should 
simply be interpreted as identifying the conditional means of the variables of interest. That is, 
the value of the loan taken out and the price of the property purchased. 
There are two reasons why the results should be treated carefully. The first relates to the 
nature of the sample that is used in the analysis. This is described in more detail in Section 5.2, 
but it is important to emphasise that data limitations associated with the HILDA dataset mean 
that it is only a small group of first-time home buyers whose decisions can be analysed. Hence, 
it will not be possible to readily generalise the results from the regression analysis. The second 
reason reflects the complex nature of the decisions being considered. Decisions around 
savings and housing expenditures are complex and require the needs of the household or 
individual to be considered in a life-cycle context. As noted in Chapter 2, it is likely to be 
important whether the transfer is expected as behavioural responses may differ for anticipated 
and unanticipated transfers. To assign a causal interpretation to the regression estimates 
would most likely require a more complex methodology that considered the nature of economic 
decisions over the life-cycle and additional information about the transfers that are analysed. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the analysis provides the first insight into how the financial 
aspects of home purchase may be related to intergenerational transfers from an Australian 
perspective. 
5.2 Data, methodological issues and sample specification 
5.2.1 Duration models 
Prior to presenting the results from the duration or hazard rates models, it is important that a 
number of methodological and data issues are discussed. 
Duration or hazard rate modelling requires information about the time spent in particular states. 
A state here can be thought of as a period of time spent in a tenure such as renting or co-
residence with parents. The HILDA data provides the opportunity to undertake such analysis 
because its longitudinal or panel nature means that individuals and households are interviewed 
repeatedly over time. Moreover, the rich set of covariates available in HILDA means that it is 
possible to identify the impact of a variety of observable characteristics on transitions into 
home ownership. 
A key consideration when undertaking duration analysis is the problem of length-biased 
sampling. To understand why this is potentially a problem, consider a set of individuals who we 
are interested in identifying their transition or hazard into home ownership. 15 For example, in 
the HILDA sample all individuals are interviewed for the first time in 2001. This provides a stock 
or set of individuals whose tenure status can be measured at that date. Individuals who are not 
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in home ownership in 2001 will be ‘at risk’ of entering into that tenure status (home ownership) 
in the future. A key problem that often arises in duration analysis is that for a ‘stock’ sample, 
such as the set of individuals interviewed in HILDA for the first time in 2001, it will not always 
be possible to identify how long individuals have been in their initial state. It is well recognised 
in the duration modelling literature that in such a stock sample, individuals who have been in a 
particular state (non-home ownership) for an extended period of time will be more likely to 
appear in the sample. Moreover, such individuals might, because of unobservable 
characteristics, be more likely to remain in the non-ownership state in the future. Inclusion of 
such individuals in any analysis will likely lead to biased estimates from duration estimates. 
The problem of length-biased sampling is avoided in HILDA by focusing on individuals who 
have not previously owned housing. It is possible to do so because in waves 6 and 10 of the 
HILDA survey individuals are asked: 
Do you currently own OR have you ever owned a residential property? 
At what age did you first acquire, or start buying, a residential property? 
Hence it is possible to define a set of individuals who, in the first wave of HILDA (and waves 6 
and 10), had not yet entered into home ownership. Moreover, given information about age, it is 
possible to identify how long they have been in that state. This information allows the problem 
of length-biased sampling to be avoided as full information about how long an individual has in 
fact been in the ‘non-ownership’ state can be inferred. 
The second issue to note around the duration models is the unit of analysis. Decisions around 
housing, for example, are generally considered to be made at the household or income unit 
level. The covariate of interest in this study, however, is an intergenerational transfer or 
bequest that is reported and received at the individual level. To address this, the duration 
models are estimated using a number of different samples. In the first instance, the time to first 
home ownership is modelled at the individual level. Such an approach means that members of 
a couple are separate observations in the sample and both will likely report transition into home 
ownership simultaneously. While it is possible to control for marital status, the receipt of an 
intergenerational transfer is reported at the individual level and it is likely to be reported for only 
one member of the couple notwithstanding its impact on the joint decision around home 
ownership. To address this concern, the duration models are estimated with two alternative 
‘units of observation’. First, duration models are estimated for individuals who remain 
unpartnered throughout the period of analysis. That is, a sample of individuals who remain 
single is analysed. Second duration models are estimated for couples, where those couples 
remain partnered throughout the period of analysis. In the latter case, if either member of the 
couple receives a transfer or bequest then it is attributed to the ‘couple’. For the sample of 
couples, it is simply assumed that the male represents the head of the household and the 
characteristics of the couple such as age and education are represented by the characteristics 
of the male. 
The number of spells for each of the samples is set out in Table 7 below along with some 
characteristics of those spells. The number of spells for individuals considered separately is, as 
expected, greater than that for the sample of singles and couples. As expected, fewer spells 
among the couples are censored, that is, observation of the spell is completed prior to the unit 
of observation being observed to transition into home ownership for the first time. It has been 
noted in the literature previously that marriage or partnering is an important determinant of 
transitions into home ownership, and in general it might be expected that couple households 
are more likely to transition into home ownership than other types of households (Hendershott 
et al. 2009). The proportion of couples that receive a bequest is higher (7.7%) compared to 
those individuals who remain single throughout the sample period (3.5%). Recall, however, 
that for couples a transfer may be received by either member of the household and attributed 
to that household. Interestingly, couple households receive fewer parental transfers than the 
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other groups, though the amount transferred tends to be higher ($12 774) than that received by 
all individuals ($8250) or singles ($6040). 
Table 7: Spells prior to first home ownership 
 Individuals Singles Couples 
No spells 5,584 3,508 776 
Proportion censored spells 0.643 0.875 0.595 
Proportion females 0.528 0.505 - 
% spells in which bequest received 0.049 0.035 0.077 
Value bequest if received ($) $47,731 $40,185 $94947 
% spells in which transfer received 0.254 0.306 0.173 
% spells in which parental transfer 
>$5000 received 
0.052 0.052 0.052 
Total value transfers if received ($) $8,250 $6,040 $12,774 
Source: Authors' own calculations using HILDA data, waves 1–13. 
5.2.2 Regression models 
The regression models also focus on the behaviours of first-time home owners. In particular, 
the value of the home purchased and the value of the loan taken out to finance the home 
purchase. The analysis is, however, more limited by data considerations than the duration 
analysis. In particular, individuals are only asked about the value of the loan taken out in waves 
6 and 10 of the HILDA data. Moreover, the question relates only to the current home that is 
occupied as an owner-occupier. In some cases, individuals had purchased a home as a first-
time buyer and subsequently returned to rental tenure or purchased a second home by the 
time of the interview in waves 6 and 10. Further, for those individuals who entered into home 
ownership for the first time after wave 10, it was not possible to conclusively identify the value 
of the loan taken out for the purpose of purchasing an owner-occupied dwelling. 
These data constraints mean that the analysis is restricted to a set of respondents in waves 6 
(or 10) of HILDA who had purchased their first home prior to wave 6 (10) and remained in that 
dwelling until waves 6 (10). The regressions are undertaken for individuals only and 
characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 8 below. Note that separate means are shown 
for those individuals who do (and do not) receive a bequest or transfer two years prior to the 
purchase of their first home. The number of individuals who receive a bequest is relatively 
small (38) and the regression results presented in Section 5.3 should be interpreted with that 




Table 8: Summary statistics, regression analysis 








Age (years) 31.089 34.474 31.649 28.112 
New South Wales 0.289 0.316 0.292 0.276 
Victoria 0.225 0.342 0.225 0.267 
Queensland 0.228 0.158 0.232 0.181 
South Australia 0.095 0.079 0.091 0.121 
Western Australia 0.085 0.053 0.089 0.052 
Tasmania/ ACT NT 0.077 0.053 0.072 0.103 
Completed HS 0.188 0.184 0.191 0.164 
Post HS qualification 0.182 0.105 0.171 0.233 
Undergraduate degree 0.225 0.263 0.216 0.302 
Postgraduate degree 0.091 0.158 0.089 0.129 
Dis/able inc. ($0,000s) 3.788 5.670 3.857 3.898 
Received bequest 0.000 1.000 0.040 0.034 
Amt bequest ($0,000s) 0.000 6.625 0.203 0.691 
Recd parental transfer 0.121 0.105 0.000 1.000 
Amt transfer ($0,000s) 0.178 0.387 0.000 1.473 
House price ($0,000s) 31.104 38.782 30.858 35.417 
Housing loan ($0,000s) 22.983 21.363 22.458 26.274 
No observations 924 38 846 116 
Source: Authors' own calculations using HILDA data, waves 1–10. 
As expected, those individuals who receive a bequest tend to be somewhat older (34.5 years) 
compared to those who do not receive a bequest (31.1 years). In comparison, those who 
receive a transfer are younger than those who do not (28.1 years and 31.6 years respectively). 
Of particular interest are the size of the home loan and the value of the house which is 
purchased. Among those who receive a bequest, the purchase price is somewhat higher 
compared to those who do not receive a bequest ($387 000 and $310 000 respectively), while 
the value of the home loan taken out is similar ($213 000 and $230 000 respectively). Among 
those who report receiving a transfer from parents, the purchase price and loan value are 
higher ($354 000 and $262 000 respectively) compared to those who do not report receiving a 
parental transfer ($308 000 and $224 000 respectively). 
5.3 Empirical estimates 
5.3.1 Duration models 
The results from the duration models are presented in Tables 9 to 14 below. The results 
reported are those for the set of individuals (or couples) aged less than 65 years of age. This 
age corresponds with entry into retirement for most individuals and it is likely that if the initial 
transition home ownership has not occurred by that age it is unlikely to occur. Alternative 
specifications that consider only those individuals aged less than 45 years of age and those 
that include all individuals are also estimated with similar results to those in Tables 9 to 14.16 
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Results are presented separately for all individuals (Tables 9 and 12), those who remain 
singles prior to censoring or entering into home ownership (Tables 10 and 13) and couple 
households (Tables 11 and 14). A series of models are estimated for each sample that 
measures the receipt of a bequest or a parental transfer differently. In particular, estimates 
from models that incorporate indicator variables that capture the receipt of a bequest in the 
current or previous periods, the value of bequests received along with the receipt of a large 
bequest (>$10 000) are reported. In each case, the receipt or value of the bequest is a time 
varying covariate which takes on positive values only in those periods where the bequest is 
received. A similar set of specifications are presented for parental transfers. In the case of 
couples, the receipt and amount of a bequest or transfer considers both individuals in the 
couple household. 
The duration models can be interpreted by considering what effect the covariate of interest has 
on the hazard or transition into first home ownership. The underlying or baseline hazard is not 
reported. Rather, the coefficients indicate how the baseline hazard is moved, in a proportional 
sense, by the coefficient of interest. For example, in column (1) of Table 9 the coefficient on the 
‘Received bequest’ variable indicates that the receipt of a bequest shifts up the baseline 
hazard by approximately 97 per cent, ceteris paribus.17 That is, it effectively doubles the hazard 
or the conditional probability of transitioning into first home ownership. In comparison, being 
married more than triples the baseline hazard or the conditional probability of transitioning into 
first home ownership, ceteris paribus. The large effect of being married has been noted in other 
research such as Hendershott et al. (2009). 
In general, the results of the duration models are consistent with a priori expectations. The 
results for all individuals are reported in Table 9 below. As expected, there is a clear life-cycle 
pattern associated with the hazard into first home ownership which peaks at ages 25–34 years. 
Similarly, the hazard into first home ownership is increasing in education levels. Education 
levels here could be interpreted as a proxy for permanent income and similar patterns are 
observed in the results reported in Tables 10 and 11 below. 
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Table 9: Duration model estimates, all individuals (bequests) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 0.106** 0.149*** 0.107** 0.105** 0.149*** 
(0.0468) (0.0525) (0.0468) (0.0468) (0.0525) 
Age 25–34 years 0.432*** 0.393*** 0.432*** 0.428*** 0.392*** 
(0.0572) (0.0648) (0.0572) (0.0572) (0.0648) 
Age 35–44 years 0.108 0.0780 0.108 0.106 0.0772 
(0.0747) (0.0833) (0.0747) (0.0747) (0.0833) 
Age 45–54 years -0.0973 -0.167 -0.0914 -0.103 -0.168 
(0.105) (0.116) (0.104) (0.105) (0.116) 
Age 55–64 years 0.119 0.168 0.123 0.115 0.166 
(0.135) (0.141) (0.135) (0.135) (0.141) 
New South Wales -0.0989 -0.166 -0.105 -0.0983 -0.165 
(0.0985) (0.106) (0.0985) (0.0985) (0.106) 
Victoria -0.130 -0.244** -0.138 -0.130 -0.244** 
(0.101) (0.110) (0.101) (0.101) (0.110) 
Queensland -0.0621 -0.144 -0.0673 -0.0630 -0.145 
(0.101) (0.109) (0.101) (0.101) (0.109) 
South Australia -0.0929 -0.176 -0.0899 -0.0877 -0.173 
(0.117) (0.128) (0.117) (0.117) (0.128) 
Western Australia 0.243** 0.159 0.230** 0.241** 0.159 
(0.113) (0.124) (0.113) (0.113) (0.124) 
Completed HS -0.0109 0.0250 -0.00585 -0.0123 0.0242 
(0.0681) (0.0765) (0.0681) (0.0681) (0.0765) 
Post HS qual. 0.343*** 0.311*** 0.350*** 0.344*** 0.311*** 
(0.0678) (0.0764) (0.0678) (0.0678) (0.0764) 
Undergraduate 0.489*** 0.501*** 0.489*** 0.490*** 0.501*** 
(0.0640) (0.0717) (0.0640) (0.0640) (0.0717) 
Postgraduate 0.483*** 0.546*** 0.494*** 0.486*** 0.545*** 
(0.0853) (0.0937) (0.0852) (0.0853) (0.0937) 
Dis. Inc. ($000s) 0.146*** 0.139*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.139*** 
(0.00705) (0.00773) (0.00705) (0.00706) (0.00773) 
Married 1.240*** 1.174*** 1.238*** 1.239*** 1.174*** 
(0.0522) (0.0572) (0.0522) (0.0522) (0.0572) 
Received bequest 0.683*** 
- - - - 
(0.156) 
Received bequest (t-1) 
- 
0.199 
- - - 
(0.226) 





Received lge bequest 




Received Large bequest 
(t-1) - - - - 
0.460 
(0.280) 
Log likelihood -6724.43 -5508.04 -6723.23 -6720.92 -5507.24 
No. observations 32,560 27,124 32,560 32,560 27,124 
Source: Own calculations using waves 1–13 of HILDA. *** means significance at 1 per cent level, ** significance at 
5 per cent level and * at 10 per cent level. 
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Table 10: Duration model estimates, singles (bequests) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.0527 -0.0190 -0.0570 -0.0533 -0.0197 
(0.0991) (0.111) (0.0993) (0.0991) (0.111) 
Age 25–34 years 0.572*** 0.495*** 0.572*** 0.578*** 0.496*** 
(0.125) (0.140) (0.125) (0.125) (0.140) 
Age 35–44 years 0.438*** 0.249 0.432*** 0.441*** 0.249 
(0.157) (0.180) (0.157) (0.157) (0.180) 
Age 45–54 years 0.484** 0.291 0.476** 0.484** 0.290 
(0.194) (0.219) (0.194) (0.194) (0.219) 
Age 55–64 years 0.910*** 0.893*** 0.909*** 0.901*** 0.894*** 
(0.237) (0.250) (0.237) (0.237) (0.250) 
New South Wales 0.0644 0.328 0.0475 0.0454 0.326 
(0.235) (0.284) (0.236) (0.236) (0.284) 
Victoria 0.173 0.340 0.161 0.161 0.340 
(0.240) (0.291) (0.241) (0.240) (0.291) 
Queensland 0.283 0.415 0.267 0.267 0.413 
(0.243) (0.295) (0.243) (0.243) (0.295) 
South Australia 0.353 0.569* 0.343 0.337 0.569* 
(0.267) (0.319) (0.267) (0.267) (0.319) 
Western Australia 0.346 0.606* 0.329 0.327 0.604* 
(0.267) (0.315) (0.267) (0.267) (0.315) 
Completed HS -0.358** -0.326** -0.369** -0.356** -0.325** 
(0.144) (0.162) (0.145) (0.144) (0.162) 
Post HS qual. 0.351** 0.271 0.353** 0.354** 0.272 
(0.152) (0.171) (0.152) (0.152) (0.171) 
Undergraduate 0.352** 0.283* 0.359** 0.356** 0.284* 
(0.140) (0.158) (0.141) (0.140) (0.158) 
Postgraduate 0.114 0.191 0.137 0.0976 0.191 
(0.213) (0.228) (0.213) (0.214) (0.229) 
Dis. Inc. ($000s) 0.294*** 0.274*** 0.294*** 0.293*** 0.274*** 
(0.0217) (0.0245) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0245) 
Rcd bequest 0.884*** 
- - - - 
(0.324) 
Rcd bequest (t-1) 
- 
0.281 
- - - 
(0.506) 





Rcd lge bequest 




Rcd lge beq. (t-1) 
- - - - 
0.291 
(0.713) 
Log likelihood -1858.48 -1503.36 -1855.71 -1856.94 -1503.42 
No. observations 16,879 13,446 16,879 16,879 13,446 
Source: Own calculations using waves 1–13 of HILDA. *** means significance at 1 per cent level, ** significance at 
5 per cent level and * at 10 per cent level. 
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Table 11: Duration model estimates, couple households (bequests) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 25–34 years 0.0396 0.0557 0.0370 0.0384 -0.169 
(0.147) (0.166) (0.147) (0.147) (0.198) 
Age 35–44 years -0.118 -0.134 -0.120 -0.121 -0.314 
(0.206) (0.229) (0.206) (0.206) (0.253) 
Age 45–54 years -0.483* -0.594* -0.491* -0.486* -0.821** 
(0.292) (0.339) (0.292) (0.292) (0.363) 
Age 55–64 years -1.146** -0.913* -1.173** -1.149** -1.022** 
(0.481) (0.495) (0.485) (0.482) (0.505) 
New South Wales -0.0592 -0.310 -0.0608 -0.0577 -0.338 
(0.243) (0.249) (0.243) (0.242) (0.272) 
Victoria -0.348 -0.610** -0.348 -0.348 -0.661** 
(0.257) (0.266) (0.257) (0.257) (0.293) 
Queensland -0.230 -0.464* -0.226 -0.227 -0.421 
(0.247) (0.253) (0.247) (0.247) (0.276) 
South Australia -0.213 -0.465 -0.195 -0.199 -0.455 
(0.289) (0.303) (0.288) (0.288) (0.333) 
Western Australia 0.260 -0.136 0.262 0.257 -0.104 
(0.291) (0.321) (0.291) (0.291) (0.355) 
Completed HS 0.184 0.104 0.186 0.186 0.101 
(0.172) (0.196) (0.172) (0.172) (0.226) 
Post HS qual. 0.265 0.261 0.266 0.266 0.206 
(0.163) (0.181) (0.163) (0.163) (0.208) 
Undergraduate 0.385** 0.490*** 0.389** 0.390** 0.724*** 
(0.170) (0.183) (0.170) (0.169) (0.203) 
Postgraduate 0.302 0.403 0.308 0.307 0.550* 
(0.251) (0.270) (0.251) (0.251) (0.301) 
No. dep. children -0.213*** -0.206*** -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.169** 
(0.0598) (0.0658) (0.0598) (0.0598) (0.0689) 
Dis. Inc. ($000s) 0.164*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.147*** 
(0.0223) (0.0230) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0242) 
Received bequest 0.455 
- - - - 
(0.325) 
Received bequest (t-1) 
- 
0.672* 
- - - 
(0.366) 





Received lge bequest 




Received large bequest (t-1) 
- - - - 
1.334*** 
(0.476) 
Log likelihood -957.37 -799.80 -957.62 -957.75 -657.05 
No. observations 3,256 2,835 3,256 3,256 2,524 
Source: Own calculations using waves 1–13 of HILDA. *** means significance at 1 per cent level, ** significance at 
5 per cent level and * at 10 per cent level. 
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Of main interest in the present analysis is the effect of bequests and parental transfers on the 
transition into first home ownership. In this respect, the evidence suggests that the concurrent 
receipt of a bequest increases the hazard into first-time home ownership while the receipt of a 
bequest lagged one period does not do so. For example, focusing on columns 1 and 2 in Table 
9 we observe that the coefficient on ‘received bequest’ is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating a positive association between concurrent receipt of a bequest and the hazard into 
first home ownership. In the case of the bequest received in the previous period (received 
bequest (t-1)), however, the estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant. Intuitively it might 
have been expected that the receipt of a bequest would have a lagged impact on housing-
related transitions. It may be the case, however, that individuals also inherit a property at the 
same time as the receipt of a bequest is reported. It is not possible with the HILDA data to 
separately identify such transfers. 
An advantage of the HILDA data is that it also contains information on the value of bequests 
and parental transfers received. The amount of the bequest measured in $000s (column 3, 
Table 9) is also positive and significant (0.00456). Similarly, the receipt of a large bequest is 
also positively associated with an increase in the hazard rate into first home ownership (column 
4, Table 9). 
The results from the samples of individuals who are single throughout the period of analysis 
(Table 10) and couple households (Table 11) are similar though somewhat more nuanced. In 
the case of singles, the results are similar to those for all individuals. That is, there is evidence 
that the receipt of bequests, the amount of a bequest, and the receipt of a large bequest are all 
positively associated with transition into first home ownership. In each case the estimated 
coefficients are slightly larger than that for the set of all individuals reported in Table 9. 
For couple households (Table 11), the strongest results are associated with the receipt of a 
large bequest in the previous period. While concurrent receipt of a bequest and the concurrent 
receipt of large bequests are associated with a higher likelihood that the household transitions 
into first-time home ownership, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Such a pattern 
highlights the need for additional analysis, but may simply capture the different decision-
making processes in households where agreement is required at the household level for major 
decisions such as tenure choice following the receipt of a bequest. 
The results for the duration models incorporating information about transfers indicate 
somewhat different patterns (Tables 12 to 14). In general, for the socio-demographic 
characteristics the results are similar to those discussed above. That is, the hazard into first-
time home ownership peaks for the age group 25–34 years, is increasing in education levels 
and positively related to disposable income. 
Again, interest is centred on the effect of the receipt and amount of parental transfers. Here the 
results are somewhat different to those reported for bequests. Rather than increasing the 
hazard into first home ownership, there is evidence that receipt of a parental transfer is 
associated with a decrease in the hazard into first-time home ownership (singles and 
individuals, column 1 Tables 12 and 13 respectively) or, in the case of couples, has no effect 
(Table 14). This may reflect the fact that many individuals in HILDA report the receipt of a 
parental transfer each period. In many cases, such transfers appear to be small and unrelated 
to transitions into home ownership. While it is not possible to identify the reason for the 
parental transfer in HILDA, when only large transfers are considered (>$5000) there is a clear 
positive association with the receipt of a parental transfer and the transition into first-time home 
ownership (column 4, Tables 12 and 14). For singles, however, the effect is only significant for 




Table 12: Duration model estimates, all individuals (parental transfers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 0.106** 0.105** 0.148*** 0.104** 0.147*** 
(0.0468) (0.0468) (0.0525) (0.0468) (0.0525) 
Age 25–34 years 0.416*** 0.434*** 0.394*** 0.442*** 0.402*** 
(0.0574) (0.0572) (0.0648) (0.0573) (0.0649) 
Age 35–44 years 0.0855 0.111 0.0801 0.122 0.0899 
(0.0750) (0.0747) (0.0833) (0.0749) (0.0835) 
Age 45–54 years -0.116 -0.0884 -0.164 -0.0774 -0.154 
(0.105) (0.104) (0.116) (0.105) (0.116) 
Age 55–64 years 0.101 0.131 0.172 0.141 0.183 
(0.136) (0.135) (0.141) (0.135) (0.141) 
New South Wales -0.111 -0.110 -0.169 -0.110 -0.169 
(0.0984) (0.0985) (0.106) (0.0984) (0.106) 
Victoria -0.134 -0.138 -0.246** -0.144 -0.251** 
(0.101) (0.101) (0.110) (0.101) (0.110) 
Queensland -0.0775 -0.0746 -0.146 -0.0739 -0.149 
(0.101) (0.101) (0.109) (0.101) (0.109) 
South Australia -0.0969 -0.0957 -0.176 -0.0945 -0.175 
(0.117) (0.117) (0.128) (0.117) (0.128) 
Western Australia 0.227** 0.232** 0.156 0.233** 0.156 
(0.113) (0.113) (0.124) (0.113) (0.124) 
Completed HS 0.00747 -0.00396 0.0262 -0.00689 0.0244 
(0.0681) (0.0681) (0.0765) (0.0681) (0.0765) 
Post HS qual. 0.357*** 0.347*** 0.311*** 0.343*** 0.309*** 
(0.0678) (0.0678) (0.0764) (0.0678) (0.0765) 
Undergraduate 0.507*** 0.497*** 0.502*** 0.491*** 0.496*** 
(0.0640) (0.0639) (0.0716) (0.0640) (0.0717) 
Postgraduate 0.508*** 0.489*** 0.545*** 0.483*** 0.540*** 
(0.0853) (0.0854) (0.0938) (0.0854) (0.0937) 
Dis. Inc. ($000s) 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.139*** 0.145*** 0.139*** 
(0.00707) (0.00707) (0.00774) (0.00707) (0.00772) 
Married 1.235*** 1.241*** 1.174*** 1.240*** 1.174*** 
(0.0522) (0.0522) (0.0572) (0.0522) (0.0572) 
Recd parental transfer -0.278*** 
- - - - 
(0.103) 
Amount parental transfer 
- 
0.00313** 
- - - 
(0.00147) 





Large parental transfer  




Large parental transfer (t-1) 
- - - - 
0.467** 
(0.184) 
Log likelihood -6728.36 -6730.66 -5507.84 -6727.38 -5505.59 
No. observations 32,560 32,560 27,124 32,560 27,124 
Source: Own calculations using waves 1–13 of HILDA. *** means significance at 1 per cent level, ** significance at 
5 per cent level and * at 10 per cent level. 
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Table 13: Duration model estimates, singles (parental transfers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 
-0.0525 -0.0545 -0.0191 -0.0553 -0.0197 
(0.0991) (0.0992) (0.111) (0.0991) (0.111) 
Age 25–34 years 
0.544*** 0.598*** 0.503*** 0.588*** 0.514*** 
(0.125) (0.125) (0.140) (0.125) (0.141) 
Age 35–44 years 
0.406*** 0.457*** 0.256 0.450*** 0.268 
(0.157) (0.157) (0.181) (0.157) (0.181) 
Age 45–54 years 
0.438** 0.475** 0.292 0.485** 0.306 
(0.194) (0.195) (0.219) (0.194) (0.219) 
Age 55–64 years 
0.875*** 0.934*** 0.902*** 0.931*** 0.922*** 
(0.237) (0.237) (0.250) (0.237) (0.250) 
New South Wales 
0.0535 0.0503 0.325 0.0596 0.328 
(0.235) (0.236) (0.284) (0.235) (0.284) 
Victoria 
0.171 0.160 0.340 0.166 0.339 
(0.240) (0.241) (0.291) (0.240) (0.291) 
Queensland 
0.259 0.270 0.413 0.270 0.413 
(0.243) (0.243) (0.295) (0.243) (0.295) 
South Australia 
0.348 0.351 0.568* 0.357 0.568* 
(0.267) (0.267) (0.319) (0.267) (0.319) 
Western Australia 
0.324 0.328 0.603* 0.333 0.608* 
(0.267) (0.267) (0.315) (0.267) (0.315) 
Completed HS 
-0.325** -0.345** -0.324** -0.352** -0.333** 
(0.144) (0.144) (0.162) (0.144) (0.162) 
Post HS qual. 
0.357** 0.349** 0.269 0.347** 0.266 
(0.152) (0.152) (0.172) (0.152) (0.172) 
Undergraduate 
0.370*** 0.344** 0.276* 0.346** 0.262* 
(0.141) (0.141) (0.158) (0.141) (0.158) 
Postgraduate 
0.157 0.139 0.190 0.124 0.168 
(0.213) (0.213) (0.228) (0.213) (0.229) 
Dis. Inc. ($000s) 
0.290*** 0.291*** 0.274*** 0.294*** 0.277*** 
(0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0245) (0.0216) (0.0244) 
Recd parental transfer 
-0.438** 
- - - - 
(0.220) 
Amount parental transfer - 
0.0136*** 
- - - 
(0.00385) 








Large parental transfer (t-1) - - - - 
0.820** 
(0.342) 
Log likelihood -1859.14 -1857.55 -1503.10 -1860.81 -1501.23 
No. observations 16,879 16,879 13,446 16,879 13,446 
Source: Own calculations using waves 1–13 of HILDA. *** means significance at 1 per cent level, ** significance at 
5 per cent level and * at 10 per cent level. 
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Table 14: Duration model estimates, couples (parental transfers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 25–34 years 
0.0422 0.0411 -0.154 0.0626 0.0683 
(0.147) (0.147) (0.197) (0.148) (0.166) 
Age 35–44 years 
-0.119 -0.106 -0.316 -0.0885 -0.126 
(0.207) (0.206) (0.253) (0.207) (0.230) 
Age 45–54 years 
-0.490* -0.475 -0.820** -0.454 -0.589* 
(0.292) (0.292) (0.363) (0.293) (0.340) 
Age 55–64 years 
-1.138** -1.120** -1.028** -1.100** -0.887* 
(0.482) (0.481) (0.506) (0.482) (0.495) 
New South Wales 
-0.0562 -0.0721 -0.344 -0.0781 -0.317 
(0.243) (0.243) (0.272) (0.243) (0.249) 
Victoria 
-0.341 -0.345 -0.631** -0.368 -0.616** 
(0.257) (0.257) (0.293) (0.258) (0.266) 
Queensland 
-0.226 -0.228 -0.412 -0.243 -0.464* 
(0.247) (0.247) (0.276) (0.247) (0.253) 
South Australia 
-0.196 -0.196 -0.429 -0.224 -0.442 
(0.288) (0.288) (0.333) (0.289) (0.302) 
Western Australia 
0.265 0.268 -0.112 0.263 -0.146 
(0.292) (0.291) (0.356) (0.291) (0.321) 
Completed HS 
0.192 0.196 0.0996 0.187 0.103 
(0.172) (0.172) (0.226) (0.172) (0.196) 
Post HS qual. 
0.268 0.274* 0.218 0.275* 0.272 
(0.163) (0.163) (0.208) (0.163) (0.181) 
Undergraduate 
0.393** 0.403** 0.743*** 0.391** 0.501*** 
(0.170) (0.169) (0.202) (0.169) (0.183) 
Postgraduate 
0.305 0.274 0.561* 0.290 0.399 
(0.251) (0.255) (0.301) (0.252) (0.270) 
No dependent child 
-0.216*** -0.212*** -0.172** -0.212*** -0.205*** 
(0.0598) (0.0598) (0.0688) (0.0598) (0.0657) 
Dis. Inc. ($000s) 
0.163*** 0.162*** 0.148*** 0.163*** 0.162*** 
(0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0242) (0.0224) (0.0230) 
Recd parental transfer 
0.00426 
- - - - 
(0.207) 
Amount parental transfer - 
0.0112 
- - - 
(0.00812) 








Amt parental transfer (t-1) - - - - 
0.386 
(0.421) 
Log likelihood -958.23 -956.45 -659.86 -956.20 -800.82 
No. observations 3,256 3,256 2,524 3,256 2,835 
Source: Own calculations using waves 1–13 of HILDA. *** means significance at 1 per cent level, ** significance at 
5 per cent level and * at 10 per cent level. 
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Further evidence about the size of the parental transfer being important is the clear positive 
association between the amount of the parental transfer and the hazard into home ownership 
for all individuals and singles (column 2, Tables 12 and 13). For couple households, it is only 
the receipt of a large concurrent parental transfer which is positively associated with the 
transition into first home ownership (column 4, Table 14). Evidence from other countries 
suggests that large transfers are often associated with the purchase of a home and this result 
would be consistent with such a pattern. 
The results of the duration analysis clearly suggest that the receipt of an intergenerational 
transfer, either in the form of a gift from parents or a bequest, are associated with a higher 
likelihood of transition into first home ownership. It is also true; however, that the relationship is 
dependent on the nature of the transfer and the household type or unit of observation being 
considered. In terms of the ‘nature’ of the transfer, it is likely that the motives underlying the 
transfer are also important for understanding its impact on the transition into first home 
ownership. At present, HILDA does not contain details about the motivation of the giver or the 
intended purpose of the transfer. 
5.3.2 Survivor functions 
The duration analysis provides some insight into how the concurrent or recent receipt of a 
transfer impacts on the hazard into first home ownership. An alternative graphical way to 
represent the same process is to consider the survivor function. This shows the probability that 
a non-home owner will ‘survive’ or remain in non-home ownership past year j of a spell. At the 
‘commencement of time' all individuals (or households) survive as no-one has entered 
ownership and so the value of the survivor function is one. As moves into home ownership 
occur for the first time, the survivor function declines toward its lower bound value of zero; 
unlike the hazard function, the survivor function will never increase. 
The survivor function for each of the three groups considered are presented in Figures 3 to 5 
below. In each case, survivor functions are presented for those who do and do not receive a 
transfer or bequest. For example, in Figure 3 we present the survivor function for all individuals, 
where the sample is broken down into those who receive a parental transfer and those who do 
not receive a parental transfer. The receipt of a transfer is presented separately for all transfers 
and the receipt of a large transfer. In each case, 95 per cent confidence intervals around the 
survivor functions are also displayed. 
The survivor functions are largely consistent with the results from the duration models. In 
general, the survivor function for those who receive a transfer, either in the form of a bequest 
or a parental transfer, lie below those who do not. This can be interpreted as meaning those 
individuals who do not receive a transfer are less likely to exit into first-time home ownership. 
Indeed, this is the same pattern that was identified, in general, in the duration models. It is not 
the case, however, that the survivor functions are always statistically different from one 
another. The differences are most pronounced in the case of bequests and large parental 
transfers. In some instances, it would appear that the relatively small number of observations 
that receive a transfer in any given period means that the survivor functions are not statistically 




Figure 3: Survivor function, all individuals 
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Figure 5: Survivor function, couples 
 
5.3.3 Regression models 
The regression models are estimated using a smaller set of individuals than were included in 
the duration models. As discussed previously, there is more limited information on the value of 
the loans and price paid for first-time home purchasers given the structure of the questions in 
the HILDA data. The implication of this is that the results should be interpreted cautiously and 
are most appropriately considered to capture the conditional mean of interest. That is, 
conditional on a range of observable characteristics, how does the value of the loan or 
purchase price of housing differ among first-time home owners who do and do not receive a 
bequest or parental transfer. 
The regression results are presented in Tables 15 and 16. In general, the coefficients are 
consistent with a priori expectations. For example, both the value of the loan and the purchase 
price are increasing in education. For the house price regression (Table 16), the coefficient on 
NSW highlights the significantly higher house prices in New South Wales compared to other 
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Table 15: Regression model, value of loan 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female 0.141 0.565 0.0820 0.533 
(0.902) (1.045) (0.902) (1.053) 
Married 4.727*** 3.695*** 4.700*** 3.821*** 
(1.008) (1.142) (1.008) (1.149) 
Age 25–34 years 1.950* 2.147* 1.993* 1.987 
(1.031) (1.222) (1.032) (1.228) 
Age 35–44 years -2.179 -2.510* -2.119 -2.565* 
(1.338) (1.524) (1.340) (1.534) 
Age 45–54 years -4.391** -4.661* -4.269** -4.916** 
(2.163) (2.456) (2.168) (2.469) 
Age 55–64 years -15.90*** -16.73*** -15.83*** -16.96*** 
(2.667) (2.799) (2.669) (2.815) 
NSW 1.612 1.378 1.657 1.230 
(1.740) (1.932) (1.741) (1.943) 
Victoria 0.192 -0.317 0.177 -0.479 
(1.799) (2.011) (1.798) (2.022) 
Queensland 0.691 1.418 0.799 1.391 
(1.802) (2.000) (1.804) (2.012) 
South Australia -2.228 -2.867 -2.233 -2.849 
(2.094) (2.390) (2.094) (2.404) 
West Australia 0.394 -0.296 0.531 -0.284 
(2.147) (2.428) (2.150) (2.443) 
Completed HS 3.506*** 4.367*** 3.463*** 4.259*** 
(1.290) (1.525) (1.290) (1.533) 
Post HS qual. 3.183** 3.042** 3.090** 3.086** 
(1.302) (1.523) (1.305) (1.533) 
Undergraduate 8.140*** 8.603*** 8.020*** 8.500*** 
(1.243) (1.432) (1.247) (1.440) 
Postgraduate 10.73*** 11.14*** 10.56*** 11.12*** 
(1.674) (1.873) (1.678) (1.895) 
Dis. Inc. ($000s) 0.420*** 0.207 0.401** 0.197 
(0.160) (0.169) (0.159) (0.170) 
Recd bequest -2.098 












Amt parental transfer 
- - - 
-0.0392 
(0.323) 
Constant 9.357*** 10.34*** 9.202*** 10.48*** 
(2.337) (2.656) (2.342) (2.674) 
No. observations 962 758 962 758 
R
2
 0.224 0.237 0.225 0.228 
Source: Authors' own calculations based on waves 3–10 of HILDA. Regressions also include a set of year dummy 
variables that are not reported. 
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Table 16: Regression model, house price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female 0.520 1.391 0.515 1.257 
(1.266) (1.485) (1.266) (1.498) 
Married 3.260** 2.815* 3.103** 2.461 
(1.414) (1.622) (1.416) (1.634) 
Age 25–34 years 3.750*** 3.778** 3.981*** 3.946** 
(1.446) (1.735) (1.449) (1.748) 
Age 35–44 years 2.623 2.352 3.025 2.662 
(1.878) (2.165) (1.882) (2.182) 
Age 45–54 years 4.198 4.008 4.814 4.591 
(3.036) (3.488) (3.044) (3.513) 
Age 55–64 years -6.841* -7.603* -6.113 -7.083* 
(3.743) (3.976) (3.747) (4.005) 
NSW 8.081*** 7.521*** 8.298*** 7.708*** 
(2.442) (2.744) (2.444) (2.764) 
Victoria 1.788 1.202 2.007 1.625 
(2.524) (2.856) (2.524) (2.877) 
Queensland 3.162 3.617 3.330 3.778 
(2.529) (2.841) (2.533) (2.863) 
South Australia 1.308 1.156 1.353 1.146 
(2.939) (3.395) (2.939) (3.420) 
West Australia 4.065 3.483 4.346 3.486 
(3.013) (3.449) (3.019) (3.475) 
Completed HS 3.683** 4.117* 3.681** 4.266* 
(1.811) (2.166) (1.811) (2.181) 
Post HS qual. 3.007 3.171 2.747 3.000 
(1.827) (2.164) (1.832) (2.180) 
Undergraduate 11.86*** 12.34*** 11.63*** 12.56*** 
(1.744) (2.034) (1.750) (2.049) 
Postgraduate 12.51*** 12.28*** 12.31*** 11.65*** 
(2.349) (2.660) (2.355) (2.696) 
Dis. Inc. ($000s) 0.492** 0.348 0.543** 0.330 
(0.225) (0.240) (0.223) (0.242) 
Recd bequest 5.714* 













- - - 
1.149** 
(0.460) 
Constant 11.04*** 10.96*** 10.47*** 11.08*** 
(3.279) (3.772) (3.288) (3.804) 
No. observations 962 758 962 758 
R
2
 0.177 0.189 0.176 0.177 
Source: Authors' own calculations based on waves 3–10 of HILDA. Regressions also include a set of year dummy 
variables that are not reported. 
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Again, the focus is on measures of intergenerational transfers, namely bequests and parental 
transfers. In general, the estimated coefficients on this set of variables are insignificant in the 
loan value regression (Table 15). This would suggest that conditional on other observed 
variables that have been included in the regression, the value of the loan taken out by first-time 
home buyers who receive a bequest or parental transfer is not significantly different from the 
value of the loan taken out by those who do not receive a transfer of this nature. In 
comparison, the results reported in Table 16 for the house price equation are all generally 
positive and significant. That is, conditional on observables that have been included in the 
regression, the house price paid by first-time home buyers who receive a bequest or parental 
transfer is significantly greater than the price paid by those who do not receive a transfer of this 
nature. 
The results of the regression analysis suggest that for those who do receive an 
intergenerational transfer, the transfer is associated with an increase in the purchase price 
rather than a decrease in the value of loan taken out. That is, the transfer may be used to 
supplement the recipients own savings and be used to purchase a greater quantity or higher 
quality of housing rather than limiting the size of the mortgage. Such results are largely 
consistent with the findings of Engelhardt and Mayer (1998) for the United States. 
The analysis in this chapter highlights the important relationship between intergenerational 
transfers and first-time home ownership. In doing so, the analysis confirms the results identified 
in the Positioning Paper using a more robust manner that exploits additional information 
available in the HILDA data. Moreover, the regression analysis suggests an additional 
dimension through which intergenerational transfers facilitate housing consumption, namely an 
increase in the price paid by first home buyers. 
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6 INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS AND INEQUALITY 
The analysis in this chapter considers the impact of intergenerational transfers on the 
distribution of wealth in Australia over time. As noted in Chapter 3, the empirical evidence on 
this issue from other countries is somewhat mixed. Although bequests in particular have 
tended to increase in countries such as the United Kingdom, it has not led to an increase in 
measured inequality despite the fact that wealthier individuals tend to receive larger transfers. 
The reason for this relates to the pattern whereby less wealthy individuals tend to receive, in a 
proportional sense, higher transfers. 
The issue of intergenerational transfers and inequality is particularly important in the housing 
context. Housing usually represents the largest single asset that individuals or households 
acquire over the life-cycle. With the recent rapid increase in housing prices, there is a potential 
for intergenerational transfers backed by these assets having significant implications on the 
distribution of wealth in Australia. Moreover, such transfers may provide opportunities to the 
recipients that are not open to those who do not receive significant transfers in the housing 
context and wealth generation more generally. 
6.1 Data, methodological issues and sample specification 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the household wealth information which is recorded in 
special modules of the HILDA Survey. Detailed wealth information is collected in 2002 (wave 
2), 2006 (wave 6) and 2010 (wave 10). The survey data consists of a number of linked 
household and persons files. Individuals within the same household are linked within a wave, 
and individuals are tracked across waves. 
The sample for the analysis of wealth was constructed through a sequence of steps. First, a 
household `reference' person was defined for each household in wave 2. The reference person 
was selected by applying the following criteria in order: 
1. one partner of a couple 
2. lone parent 
3. single person 
4. the person with the lowest `person number' on the household questionnaire.18 
The household reference person from wave 2 was tracked across subsequent waves to create 
a longitudinal record for the household. Second, households composed of multiple families 
were dropped from the sample due to concerns for potential measurement error. Multiple family 
households are predominately group households composed of numerous single adults and the 
information on household wealth is less reliable, especially when unrelated individuals report 
for other household members. Therefore, the analysis is conditional on single family 
households. 
The focus of the analysis is the distribution of household wealth or 'net worth', and the major 
components of home net equity, total property assets and financial wealth. Net worth is 
constructed from a detailed inventory of wealth components. Home assets are defined as the 
value of equity minus debt for the principal residence. Total property assets are home assets 
plus other property (investment) holdings. Financial assets consist of the value of bank 
accounts, superannuation balances, cash and equity investments, trust funds and life 
insurance. Other components of net worth include non-financial assets such as business 
assets, vehicles and collectibles. See Summerfield et al. (2015, pp.70–77) for detailed 
information. 
                                               
18
 In the large majority of cases this method also selected the person who supplied most of the information recorded 
on the Household Questionnaire. 
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To examine intergenerational influences on the observed distribution of wealth, the role of 
bequests and parental transfers are considered in the analysis. Household receipt of bequests 
and parental transfers is constructed from the longitudinal information in the HILDA Survey. 
Using the annual responses to the survey—the household receipt of bequests and parental 
transfers is constructed by determining whether any such transfers were reported by the 
household reference person, or the partner of the reference person (where appropriate) in the 
four years prior to the 2006 and 2010 surveys, and in the two years prior to the 2002 survey, 
respectively. The total amount of bequests and parental transfers received were calculated 
analogously using either a four-year window (2006 and 2010) or a two-year window (2002). 
In analysing the distribution of wealth, and the role of bequests and parental transfers—all 
nominal values are converted to real 2014 values using the Australian Bureau of Statistics CPI 
series (for all items, Australia-wide). 
To better understand the distribution of wealth, and changes through time, the analysis 
considers the role of housing tenure. The key distinction is between home owners and renters. 
Within the group of home owners, a distinction is made between those who own the home 
outright (‘outright owners’) and those who still have a mortgage (‘mortgagees’). A range of 
demographic factors (age of reference person, family type, dependent children) and socio-
economic characteristics (reference person educational attainment, household disposable 
income, and state of residence) are considered in the analysis. 
Table 17 below presents descriptive statistics for the sample by wave of the HILDA Survey. In 
2002, the average net worth of Australian households was $664 309 in 2014 values. Average 
wealth grew in real terms by 28 per cent to 2006, and increased by a further 9 per cent from 
2006 to 2010. The slowdown in wealth growth is unsurprising given the GFC which began in 
late 2007 and the associated volatility in financial and equity markers. Home net equity 
accounted for approximately 38 per cent of households’ net worth on average in 2002 and 
2006, and 41 per cent in 2010. 
Further details on the relationship between tenure and wealth are presented in Table 17 below. 
This table presents a series of cross tabulations between household wealth (and components 
of wealth) by housing tenure in 2002, 2006 and 2010. Several features stand out. First, home 
owners on average have substantially higher average net worth than renters. Home owners, by 
definition, on average have substantial wealth held in the form of equity in the principal 
residence, and in other property investment. The most important component of household 
wealth for renters is financial wealth. Second, renters are less likely to receive a bequest and, 
conditional on receipt, the amount received is lower for renters. Renters are more likely than 
home owners to receive a parental transfer though the amount, conditional on receipt, is 




Table 17: Summary statistics, wealth analysis 
 2002 2006 2010 
Net worth (2014$) 664,309 848,744 926,827 
Net worth if >0 687,852 877,507 952,648 
Home assets 251,497 335,165 373,848 
Total property assets 308,199 461,049 495,608 
Financial wealth 250,392 327,896 498,372 
Received bequest 0.030 0.099 0.095 
Bequest amount 2544 11,289 8,232 
Rec.d parental transfer 0.086 0.142 0.101 
Parental transfer amt 568 1,387 1,289 
Tenure    
Owner (w/out mort.) 0.352 0.354 0.365 
Owner (with mort.) 0.394 0.386 0.387 
Renter 0.228 0.233 0.0.217 
Personal characteristics    
Age (years)  44 48 52 
Married/partnered 0.764 0.724 0.710 
Household structure    
Coup., no dep child. 0.372 0.379 0.398 
Coup. with dep. child. 0.392 0.345 0.312 
Lone parent with dep 0.057 0.048 0.042 
Lone person 0.143 0.175 0.190 
Other household type 0.035 0.035 0.037 
Number of children 0.699 0.612 0.523 
Socio-economic characteristics    
H/hold disp. income  1,418 1,579 1,701 
Education    
Postgraduate  0.030 0.038 0.044 
 Grad. cert./diploma 0.050 0.056 0.062 
Bachelor 0.119 0.130 0.133 
Diploma 0.088 0.093 0.097 
Certificate 0.192 0.218 0.228 
Year 12 0.138 0.131 0.111 
Year 11 0.377 0.327 0.318 
Location    
New South Wales 0.310 0.301 0.300 
Victoria 0.251 0.248 0.248 
Queensland 0.195 0.203 0.205 
South Australia 0.094 0.094 0.092 
Western Australia 0.097 0.097 0.097 
Tasmania 0.029 0.030 0.029 
Northern Territory 0.006 0.007 0.008 
Australian Capital Territory 0.017 0.019 0.019 
Observations 5149 5623 5940 




Table 18: Wealth, bequests and parental transfers by housing tenure 








Net worth (2014$) 831,543 1,048,318 638,285 145,504 
Home assets 336,588 414,953 277,701 0 
Total property assets 404,142 490,272 327,356 20,427 
Financial wealth 303,185 389,070 226,618 82,009 
Received bequest 0.033 0.037 0.030 0.019 
Bequest amount 3,277 4,366 2,304 241 
Received parental transfer 0.079 0.059 0.097 0.110 
Parental transfer amount 505 330 662 766 
 2006 
Net worth (2014$) 1,068,795 1,327,054 831,619 183,623 
Home assets 451,722 562,058 350,392 0 
Total property assets 600,630 733,360 478,737 52,873 
Financial wealth 399,153 508,800 298,457 104,291 
Received bequest 0.114 0.128 0.101 0.054 
Bequest amount 14,036 21,503 7,178 3,058 
Received parental transfer 0.117 0.083 0.149 0.223 
Parental transfer amount 1,443 1,318 1,557 1,301 
 2010 
Net worth(2014$) 1,151,480 1,406,348 910,872 197,862 
Home assets 496,613 617,188 382,785 0 
Total property assets 636,482 769,230 511,160 56,307 
Financial wealth 374,396 458,178 295,300 120,669 
Received bequest 0.103 0.105 0.102 0.069 
Bequest amount 10,212 11,786 8,726 2,218 
Received parental transfer 0.086 0.045 0.124 0.153 
Parental transfer amount 1441 910 1943 590 
Source: Authors' own calculations using waves 2, 6 and 10 HILDA. 
6.2 Empirical estimates  
6.2.1 Distribution of wealth, by tenure 
The next step in the analysis is to consider the complete distribution of household wealth. 
Figure 6 below present the kernel density plot for the distribution of household net worth in 
2002 by the household’s housing tenure. It is clear from the plot that renters have substantially 
less wealth than home owners. The wealth distribution among renters has a large mass 
bunched at zero, which is the dominant peak in Figure 6. The wealth density function for home 
owners with a mortgage is more dispersed and to the right, and the density for home owners 




The pattern of the wealth distributions by housing tenure observed in 2002 is mirrored in the 
2006 and 2010 distribution, as illustrated in Figures 7 and 8 below, respectively. This pattern in 
the distribution of wealth by tenure type reflects an array of life-cycle, family background and 
socio-economic factors. We know, for example, that younger individuals in the early stages of 
their life-cycle and housing careers have accumulated little or no net wealth and are more likely 
to reside in rental tenure. As individuals age and couple households form, wealth is 
accumulated, including through savings in the form of housing. 
Figure 6: Household wealth distribution in 2002 by tenure 
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Figure 8: Household wealth distribution in 2010 by tenure 
 
6.2.2 Changes over time in the distribution of wealth by tenure type 
The summary statistics indicated significant growth in average wealth across Australian 
households from 2002 to 2006, and to a lesser extent, 2006 to 2010. To more clearly discern 
how the growth in household wealth varies by housing tenure, the following series of figures 
presents the kernel density plots over time for each tenure category. 
Figure 9 below presents the household net worth density for home owners (with or without 
mortgages) across consecutive wealth surveys from HILDA. The rightward shift in the densities 
over time clearly reflects the strong growth in real wealth between 2002 and 2010. 
Accompanying the growth has been an increase in dispersion, characterised by lower peaks at 
modal wealth. Decomposing this evolution in the wealth distribution for outright-owners and 
mortgages—shown in Figures 10 and 11 respectively, reveals that both groups experienced 
substantial real wealth growth, though it was stronger (especially in the mid-upper range of 
wealth levels) for the outright home owner group. Figure 12 below presents the household 
worth density plots for the subpopulation of renters. The striking features of the graph are the 
substantially higher concentration at low level of net worth, and the relatively static nature of 
the densities over time. 
The pattern of changes in the wealth distributions in part reflects the importance of home 
ownership as a form of capital investment and the substantial capital gains to housing 
experienced over the 2002–10 period. The stable distribution of wealth over time for the group 
of renters, and the concentration at relatively low levels of wealth, indicates that this section of 
the population has not experienced the gains in wealth that has accrued to home owners over 
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Figure 9: Household wealth distribution 2002–10, home owners 
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Figure 11: Household wealth distribution 2002–10, home owners (with mortgage) 
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6.2.3 Counterfactual wealth distributions 
A key question for this report relates to how the distribution of wealth has been affected by 
intergenerational transfers. To address this question, a series of hypothetical wealth 
distributions are constructed in order to assess the impact of bequests and parental transfers 
on the distribution of wealth, and on distributional differences by tenure. In order to construct 
the counterfactual distributions, the multivariate method proposed by DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (1996) (DFL) are employed. 
The DFL method is based on the expression of the multivariate density function as the product 
of a conditional density and marginal distribution. Specifically, the wealth distribution at a point 
in time t, can be expressed as the product of the relation between wealth W and attributes x, 
and the distribution of attributes at time t. In particular: 
     dxtxhxWfWf tt 

   
Where  Wf t  is the wealth determination process at time t  that relates individual and family 
characteristics to wealth levels W  in the population denoted by  . The density function 
 txh  represents the distribution of attributes in year t . This formulation of the wealth 
distribution is particularly useful for making comparisons of distributions. For example, the 
difference in the distribution of wealth in 2010 and 2002 is given by the following: 
           dxtxhxWfdxtxhxWfWfWf 20022010 2002201020022010  

 
It is interesting to consider the distribution that may have prevailed if specific circumstances or 
attributes do not change, or change in a pre-specified way. For instance, the counterfactual 
wealth distribution in 2010 that may have prevailed if the distribution of attributions were given 
by a hypothetical distribution, such as all bequests set equal to zero, is given by: 
     dxtxhxWfWf 2002~~ 20102010  

 
Where    2010~2002~  txhtxh  with all ib  set identically to 0. By considering different 
counterfactual distributions such as this, it is possible to better understand how the distribution 
of bequests has changed through time, and how this is related to changes in the distributions 
of wealth or housing equity. 
The application of the DFL method is based on reweighting the observed wealth distribution 
conditional on the group of interest. For instance, to construct  Wf 2010
~
 the following 
approach is used: 


















The 2002x  is a reweighting function and the counterfactual is constructed by reweighting the 
observed 2010 wealth distribution by the ratio of the conditional distribution of attributes in the 
two years. In effect, the 2010 distribution of attributes is reweighted to mimic the 2002 
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distribution or the scenario of interest. DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) show that, by 





















which is straightforward to estimate using a probit model after pooling the observed data for the 
two years involved in the comparison. 
The next series of figures compare the observed distributions of net worth and the hypothetical 
distribution of net worth if bequests and parental transfers were mechanically set to zero. The 
probit specification for the weighting function included controls for age and educational 
attainment of the household reference person, indicators for family type, number of dependent 
children, a quadratic in household disposable income plus indicators for whether bequests or 
parental transfers were received, and the amounts of those receipts. The weighting functions 
were estimated separately by tenure status with 2002 as the reference year. 
Figure 13 below provides a comparison of the predicted wealth distribution among owners in 
2002 for the hypothetical case where all bequests and parental transfers are removed. The 
overall shape of the predicted density closely mirrors the observed distribution. There is, 
however, a detectable shift to the left of the distribution, which is greater above the mode and 
toward the top of the distribution. Similar patterns are evident when outright home owners and 
mortgagees are treated separately (Figures 14 and 15, respectively). However, for the case of 
renters, presented in Figure 16 below, the relatively low values of bequests and parental 
transfers received results in very little difference between the observed and predicted wealth 
distributions. 
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Figure 14: Predicted and actual wealth distribution, 2002 home owners (outright) 
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Figure 16: Predicted and actual wealth distribution, 2002 renters 
 
Generation of the counterfactual wealth distributions highlights the important role played by 
intergenerational transfers on wealth outcomes. In particular, it is apparent that the removal of 
bequests and parental transfers from recipient households in 2002 lead to a reduction in wealth 
inequality among home owners. Further, given the generally low wealth levels of renters, and 
the significantly smaller value of transfers received, this scenario implied a reduction in wealth 
inequality across tenure status groups. This, in turn, implies that the bequests and parental 
transfers observed in 2002 tended to increase the level of cross-sectional inequality in the 
distribution of wealth across Australian households. 
The predicted wealth distributions were then compared overtime to assess the impact of 
bequests and parental transfers on the evolution of wealth inequality over the period 2002–10. 
Figure 17 below presents the kernel density plots for the predicted and actual wealth 
distribution for home owners over the observation period. Figure 18 below presents the 
analogous distributions for renters. 
Over time the analysis indicates that the distribution of wealth became more dispersed and 
unequal; a pattern which is reflected in the wealth distributions for the set of home owners. The 
hypothetical distributions, with bequests and parental transfer shut down or effectively 
‘switched off’, indicate reduced growth in wealth inequality for the period. However, in contrast, 
the wealth distribution among renters is much more stable over time. In addition, the 
comparatively low levels of bequests and parental transfers received by renters means that 
removing those private transfers had virtually no impact on wealth inequality within this group. 
The implication from these comparisons is that bequests and parental transfers contributed to 
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Figure 17: Predicted and actual wealth distributions, 2002–10 owners 
 
Figure 18: Predicted and actual wealth distributions, 2002–10 renters 
 
The analysis in this chapter has provided insight into how the distribution of wealth is impacted 
by intergenerational transfers in the form of bequests and inter vivos transfers from parents. 
The results show two related but nonetheless distinct patterns. First, renters are less likely to 
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likely related to life-cycle considerations, with renters tending to be younger and less likely to 
receive large bequests. Related to this is the impact of intergenerational transfers over time, 
namely they have tended to increase the level of measured inequality with home owners 
gaining relative to those in rental tenure. 
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7 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As discussed in Chapter 2, housing ownership is an important part of the Australian social 
fabric and it is important that policy settings are aligned in a way that ensures that objectives 
around home ownership are achieved. At the same time, it is clear that policy must be set 
within an institutional and historical setting that may mean that the ‘ideal’ policy response is 
either unfeasible or simply unattainable. The results from the analysis in Chapters 4 to 6 should 
be read in that context. 
Notwithstanding these considerations, there are a number of dimensions along which the 
findings from the empirical analysis can in fact inform policy-making. These include outcomes 
relating to home ownership and housing security; labour supply and economic participation; 
and, retirement incomes policy in the form of savings and wealth accumulation behaviour. In 
developing appropriate policy settings that take into account the findings in this report, it is also 
important to understand the interrelated nature of the responses that are likely. Changes in 
retirement incomes policy that acknowledge the role of bequests and inter vivos gifts may 
induce behavioural responses in terms of labour supply over the long term. 
7.1.1 Tax policy—the design of appropriate taxes 
The recent review of the Australian Taxation system (the ‘Henry Report’) identified a range of 
proposals to improve the efficiency and equity of taxes (Department of Treasury 2010). One 
obvious policy that might improve the overall operation of the tax system and has clear 
implications for housing and the analysis conducted in this report is that of wealth transfer 
taxes. Bequest taxes are a ‘relatively efficient means of taxing savings’ which are unlikely to 
induce large behavioural distortions (p.137). Significantly, taxes on bequests have the potential 
to increase labour supply and savings by potential recipients. Notwithstanding the historical 
trend away from taxes of this nature in Australia, arguably such imposts should form part of a 
wider review of the tax system including the current review given the importance of inter vivos 
transfers and bequests identified in this report (Australian Government 2015). Such taxes have 
the potential to mitigate the adverse effects with respect to inequality of intergenerational 
transfers. At the same time, it is important to note that such taxes are likely to play a relatively 
minor role in this context. 
7.1.2 Tax and transfer policy—inequality and redistribution 
An important role for the tax and transfer system is the redistributive role it plays. As noted in 
Chapter 2, the Australian tax and transfers system is characterised by a relatively low level of 
benefits that are highly targeted to those in need through means testing. At present, the family 
home is excluded from the asset and income means tests that determine eligibility for benefits. 
What has not been explored in this report is how the value ‘locked’ up in housing could be 
released and used in conjunction with the transfer system to ensure sustainable outcomes over 
time. This could occur, for example, by encouraging the development of a market in reverse 
mortgages while at the same time including imputed rent from housing in the assets test. This 
would provide opportunities for asset-rich individuals to draw down and consume the value of 
wealth stored in housing while at the same time relieving pressure on the transfer system. 
7.1.3 Targeted transfer policies 
Successive Australian governments have encouraged home ownership through a range of 
mechanisms including FHOG and stamp duty concessions. It would appear that such policies 
have paid little or no attention to the role of private transfers in complementing or substituting 
for these public transfers. The evidence in this report suggests that private transfers have an 
important role in facilitating entry into home ownership. In light of this, if the policy goal is to 
increase home ownership, an argument can be set out that transfer policies designed to 
facilitate home ownership could become more targeted at those who are unlikely to benefit 
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from such transfers. That is, higher more-targeted subsidies could be directed towards those 
who are unlikely to receive transfers. 
7.1.4 The balance between public and private transfers 
In recent years a number of social scientists have argued that in liberal welfare systems, home 
ownership is the dominant housing tenure because it is an important pillar supporting limited 
government social programs (Kemeny 2005; Doling & Ronald 2010). There is some empirical 
support for this idea (Castles 1998), and, in the Australian context, Yates and Bradbury (2010) 
offer evidence that suggests Australia’s home ownership society is a pillar underpinning a 
retirement income policy that is less generous than in other countries at a similar stage of 
development. In Australia, these characteristics of retirement incomes policies and the role of 
housing are particularly important in light of increasing concern about falling rates of home 
ownership among younger cohorts. The analysis in this report offers fruitful insights into some 
of these ideas by focusing attention on the appropriate balance between public and private 
transfers. 
Lowe (2011) and Smith and Searle (2008) highlight the possibility that housing assets can be 
consumed through mechanisms such as reverse mortgages. In a life-cycle context, such 
policies provide opportunities to home-owning households to insure against income shocks. 
Moreover, there is an opportunity for existing home owners to support their children's housing 
aspirations by withdrawing equity in their own housing or by proving an explicit guarantee with 
their own housing assets. Although not explored in this report, co-residence may also provide a 
means to provide an indirect transfer to children who suffer life-events such as relationship 
breakdown which adversely impact on housing careers. The findings in this report highlight the 
potential for intergenerational transfers, supported housing equity withdrawal to play an 
important role in supporting the next generation's housing aspirations while at the same time 
relaxing the fiscal constraints faced by future Australian governments. 
Willetts (2010) develops similar themes, albeit in a slightly different manner. He argues that the 
baby boomer generation has attained a dominant position in society through their accumulation 
of wealth in housing and other assets. Moreover, other developments such as free tertiary 
education and relatively stable and prosperous economic conditions underpinned this 
accumulation of wealth. This generational imbalance could be addressed, at least in part, by 
persuading baby boomers to hand back some of these resources. Recycling housing wealth 
through mechanisms such as reverse mortgages could, is a potentially important if not the 
most important vehicle through which such redistribution could be executed. 
Of course, such a rebalancing between public and private welfare is not one that will be easily 
achieved. It is nonetheless a conversation that arguably should be initiated. The analysis in this 
report provides impetus to such a conversation by providing evidence around the important 
relationship between intergenerational transfers, housing outcomes and the distribution of 
wealth. Moreover, any such moves should necessarily take into account the potential equity 
implications of encouraging transfers in this way. As the analysis in Chapter 6 made clear, 
intergenerational transfers have the potential to exacerbate existing wealth inequalities. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The analysis in this report has sought to provide evidence on the relationship between 
intergenerational transfers and housing-related outcomes. In doing so, three separate but 
nonetheless related analytical exercises have been presented. These shed light on how 
intergenerational transfers impact on housing outcomes, and the relationship between 
transfers and measured inequality. 
The analysis in Chapter 4 focused on the tenure outcomes in wave 10 of the HILDA data. The 
findings build on and confirm the results in the Positioning Paper on the importance of 
intergenerational transfers on housing outcomes. While bequests are often received after 
making a transition into home ownership, they nevertheless help support a higher rate of home 
ownership among recipients than would otherwise be the case. This result could be due to 
increasingly precarious home ownership ‘careers’, with inheritances helping those who have 
fallen off the home ownership ladder to bounce back. Bequests are also strongly correlated 
with outright ownership. It would seem that some recipients fold their windfall gains into 
housing by paying down mortgages. 
The analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that gifts play a somewhat different role compared to 
inheritances. The former reach individuals who are younger and less well positioned as far as 
achieving home ownership is concerned. It is likely that gifts are deliberate transfers that are 
designed to alleviate borrowing constraints, and especially deposit requirements. They 
therefore have a marginally larger effect on home ownership status, despite being of smaller 
value than bequests. However, they also have a significant effect on transitions into 
mainstream home ownership and, as expected, their effect is much smaller than bequests; the 
latter are more influential in this respect and therefore play a bigger role in facilitating housing 
wealth accumulation. 
The analysis of first-time home buyers (Chapter 5) also identifies the important association 
between intergenerational transfers and housing outcomes. The receipt of bequests, for 
example, is associated with a doubling of the hazard or conditional transition into first-time 
home ownership. Similarly, the receipt of large bequests also increase the likelihood that an 
individual or couple transitions into home ownership for the first time. The analysis suggests 
that intergenerational transfers impact on housing outcomes for first-time buyers along at least 
two dimensions. First, as noted, they tend to accelerate transitions into the ownership tenure; 
second, they tend to increase the amount paid for housing rather than being used to limit the 
size of the loan taken out. 
The final piece of analysis focuses on the effect of transfers on the distribution of wealth. This 
analysis is particularly pertinent given the central role played by housing in the accumulation of 
wealth for Australian households and the potential for transfers to facilitate home ownership. 
The evidence presented suggests that intergenerational transfers over the period 2002 to 2010 
have tended to increase inequality. Moreover, there is evidence that those in rental tenures are 
less likely to receive transfers and benefit from the increased opportunities that come with such 
transfers. 
The analysis in this report has a range of policy implications. Importantly, many of these relate 
to tax and transfer policies that successive governments have quarantined from changes that 
might be seen as appropriate given the findings in this report. For example, if there is concern 
about the increasing concentration of wealth in part facilitated by intergenerational transfers 
and their role in providing opportunities in housing markets, then sound arguments may be 
made that some form of wealth taxes are appropriate. The removal of death and gift duties in 
the 1970s and the reluctance to revisit such taxes mean policy moves along these lines are 
unlikely. Similarly, there appears to be a broad consensus that the preferential treatment of 
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owner-occupied housing in the tax and transfer system will remain in place for the foreseeable 
future. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings in this report suggest that there is scope for 
considering how transfer policies may be better targeted. It would appear that some individuals 
and households benefit, at least in terms of housing outcomes and accumulation of wealth over 
time, from intergenerational transfers. This presents an opportunity for more targeted policies 
that are directed at those who are less likely to benefit from such transfers. 
More generally, the findings in this report provide an opportunity to initiate a wider discussion 
about the welfare role played by housing. The Baby Boomer generation has benefited from 
relatively good post-war economic conditions which underpinned increasing rates of home 
ownership and the accumulation of wealth through an asset that had preferential tax treatment. 
But this has seemingly been at the expense of their children's home ownership prospects. In 
2011, roughly 3 in 4 persons aged 55 years or over were owner-occupiers, but only 1 in 3 
persons under 35 years of age were home owners in that same year. Moreover, rates of home 
ownership in this young age group are 22 percentage points lower than they were nearly 30 
years ago in 1982. 
Housing wealth now occupies a different position in household wealth portfolios, as innovation 
in mortgage products have made it fungible in ways not previously possible for earlier 
generations of home owners. The cash transfers that some children are now receiving from 
their parents are a likely manifestation of housing wealth’s newly fungible nature. Given the 
importance of housing wealth in the average Australian’s wealth portfolio, it seems likely that 
some, if not most, of these intergenerational transfers are funded by parents using flexible 
mortgages to tap into their housing wealth. It appears as if these transfers are invariably 
targeted on younger households that have yet to achieve home ownership; and our findings 
suggest that they succeed in significantly lifting home ownership prospects among the younger 
generation of Australians who receive them. This recycling of housing wealth needs to be 
thoroughly documented in further research. It is a potentially important channel for the 
transmission of intergenerational wealth inequalities and could potentially substitute, in some 
dimensions, for public transfers and perform a private welfare role. 
Although relatively novel in an Australian context, there are a number of ways in which the 
analysis in this report could be extended. Perhaps the most obvious manner is by incorporating 
in a robust manner the value of in-kind transfers. It is well documented that an important 
means by which parents can assist children is through co-residence in the parental home. By 
remaining in the parental home, an opportunity is provided to younger individuals to 
accumulate savings and thereby facilitate entry into the housing market. The analysis in this 
report has not considered the value of such transfers. Given the household information 
available in HILDA, such information could potentially be included in future analysis. 
The continued collection of the HILDA data also provides ready means by which the analysis in 
this report could be extended. With the release of wave 14 HILDA, an additional wealth module 
will become available for analysis. Importantly this will provide an opportunity to consider how 
wealth has been impacted in the post-GFC period. Moreover, it will also provide additional data 
that can be applied in the duration analysis reported in Chapter 5. 
There are also other opportunities that are worthy of flagging with respect to future research. 
One clear finding in the present analysis is that the effect of inter vivos parental transfers or 
gifts is somewhat different to bequests. This reflects differences in their magnitude, but also 
their timing. It is possible that parental transfers are motivated and specifically tied to housing 
outcomes for the recipients. Identifying the motivation of the transferors would be useful and 
could potentially be asked in the HILDA data collection. Such a question could, for example, be 
posed to the recipient. In a similar vein, additional information about the inheritance of property 
would provide additional opportunities to gain insight into how intergenerational transfers 
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impact on housing outcomes. Such a question could be asked retrospectively and provide 
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APPENDIX: PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING MODELS—
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Table A1: Description of variables included in probit regression model to estimate the propensity 
score 
 Heading text In Table  
Demographics 
Male Binary 
Person born in English speaking country Binary 
Person born in non-English speaking country Binary 
Father in paid employment went respondent was 14 Binary 
Father not in paid employment went respondent was 14 Binary 
Father’s highest qualification in wave 10— University Binary 
Father’s highest qualification in wave 10— Tafe Binary 
Mean age Continuous 
Mean no. of dependent children Continuous 
Mean no. of siblings Continuous 
Mean % of waves Separated Continuous 
Mean % of waves Divorced Continuous 
Mean % of waves Widowed Continuous 
Mean % of waves Married/De facto Continuous 
Mean % of waves employed Continuous 
Mean % of waves unemployed Continuous 
Mean % of waves underemployed Continuous 
Mean % of waves couple, no child Continuous 
Mean % of couple with dependent child Continuous 
Mean % of waves couple with nondependent child Continuous 
Mean % of waves lone parent with dependents Continuous 
Mean % of waves lone person Continuous 
Labour market and 
human capital 
Mean household disposable income ($), ten thousands Continuous 
Mean % of was employed full-time Continuous 
Mean % of waves with postgraduate degree Continuous 
Mean % of waves with graduate diploma Continuous 
Mean % of waves with Bachelor degree Continuous 
Mean % of waves with Advanced Diploma/Diploma Continuous 
Mean % of waves with Certificate Continuous 
Mean % of waves Year 12 or lower Continuous 
Geography 
Mean % of waves living in VIC Continuous 
Mean % of waves living in QLD Continuous 
Mean % of waves living in SA Continuous 
Mean % of waves living in WA Continuous 
Mean % of waves living in TAS Continuous 
Mean % of waves living in NT Continuous 
Mean % of waves living in ACT Continuous 
Mental health Mean life satisfaction (out of 10) Continuous 




Table A2: Coefficient estimates of probit regression model to estimate probability of receiving a 
bequest between waves 2–10 

















































Mean % of waves Widowed 0.268 
(0.221) Omitted 
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Notes: *** significant at 1 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; * significant at 10 per cent. 
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Figure A1: Balancing diagnostics under radius matching with caliper (0.005) algorithm for 
bequest recipients aged 
(a) 25–65 
 
Note: Figure A1 illustrates the performance of the radius matching algorithm as measured by the standardised bias 
test. The figure plots the standardised percentage bias both before and after matching across each of the covariates 
entered into the probit model. It can be seen that the radius matching method successfully reduced the percentage 
bias in all of the key covariates in the probit regression model. The quality of the matched sample is seconded by 






Note: See above. 
                                               
19
 Results from the t-test equality of means is available from the authors upon request. 
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Table A3: Coefficient estimates of probit regression model to estimate probability of receiving a 
parental transfer between waves 2–10 

















































Mean % of waves Widowed -0.071 
(0.459) (omitted) 
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Notes: *** significant at 1 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; * significant at 10 per cent. 
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Figure A2: Balancing diagnostics under radius matching with caliper (0.005) algorithm for 
parental gift/transfer recipients aged 
(a) 25–65 
 
Notes: See above. 
 (b) 25–45 
 
Notes: See above.  
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